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Abstract
This thesis explores the U.S. eroding global military advantage in light of the current
changing security environment. First, I examine the process and type of erosion taking place. I
expand the existing debate and show that the erosion is not defined in monetary terms but in terms
of the declining U.S influence within the established rule-based international order. Secondly, I
use China and Russia as case-studies to define the present geopolitical rivalries and the
(re)emergence of revisionist powers. Both China and Russia aim to shape the emerging
international order and threaten the U.S. national security with the increased inter-state
competition. Thirdly, I employ the techniques of discourse, document and graph analyses to draw
conclusions about the various factors contributing to the erosion.
These factors can be divided into two broad categories: the categories of internal and
external factors. The internal factors encompass the U.S force posture in terms of its hardline
policies as well as the increased concentration within the U.S military industrial complex which
curbs competition and innovation and leads to controlled government contracts and the
prioritization of corporate interests over national security interests. The external factors include
the present global “disorder” characterized by inter-state competition, mainly Russia’s military
advancement in the global defense industry and China’s expansionist economic and military
agenda. China’s case-study concludes that its Belt Road Initiative is used as an economic tool for
military expansion into various regions of Asia, Middle East and Africa. On the other hand,
Russia’s case-study makes the connection between its increased market share in the global defense
industry hampering U.S defense corporations’ arms sales and its challenge to the U.S influence in
global affairs. While Russia provides a cost-conditionalities benefit to non-NATO members in its
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arms sales, it also seeks to impact the future of the U.S. relationship with NATO, which contains
military implications for Europe as well as for the global order.
Lastly, this thesis analyzes the shifting of alliances and the process of the formation of a
new-world order in which the U. S. military superiority is at stake. It concludes that there is a way
back for the United States to restore and sustain its global military edge based on the framework
defined in my research. The findings and strategies outlined for restoration are subject to certain
conditions and limitations which can determine the fate of the U.S. military might.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The globalized defense industrial complex has existed over decades with thriving
American dominance. The current high rise of inter-state competition is a relatively new
phenomenon. The United States is the number one military spender, and thus its global influence,
cohesion among allies and partners, economic prosperity and national security are all strategically
interlinked. The changing international order defined by shifts has developed complex challenges
for the United States national security and global influence. This research’s main purpose is to
analyze America’s eroding global military advantage being challenged. It reviews its path to
restoring its global military competitive edge. The main contribution made to the existing literature
is whether the United States will be able to restore its global military power or not. In the case that
it can be successful what strategies can be adopted to regain its monopoly within the global defense
market. The significance of whether the U.S can regain its uncontested power is not only a matter
of concern for the national security of America but, also interests researchers and other countries
since it defines the rules of the game within the international politics for the future.
The United States defense industrial base has various functions to perform and has a critical
aspect in terms of economic output and national security. It not only provides support to economic
prosperity for the U.S but also yields global competition amongst states. But recently the industrial
base has been facing multiple challenges in the form of uncertainty in government spending, shifts
in the global market, aggressive industrial policies of competitor nations and loss of vital skills in
the domestic workforce. The 2017 National Security Strategy acknowledges a healthy defense
industrial base to be an important element of the U.S power and its national security innovation
7

base but, at the same time expands the debate about how the manufacturing and defense industrial
base is under threat. 1
For decades the United States has enjoyed its dominance in the global order. This
dominance was primarily characterized by the exercise of military power in terms of arms
production and trade. Within this imperial grand strategy, the United States was the most powerful
actor in maintaining its hegemony through military power and establishing a unipolar world order
whereby, it had no other peer competitor. 2 On the contrary, it now faces various challenges within
the global security order as China’s economic and military expansion is at its peak. Despite
America maintaining its dominance to quite an extent, China has managed to dominate the region
side-by-side too creating a multipolarity whereby both powers are operating at the front wicket.
This military challenge is accompanied by economic expansion in terms of heavy trade and
investment by China. Not only does the United States face its global military dominance being
challenged in but with China’s economic dominance a dual-hierarchy has been established at the
global scale.
This changing strategic environment for the United States is countered by China and
Russia; both competing with the United States global positioning. With an end of the INF treaty,
the future for U.S-Russian strategic stability is in question too. The country is no longer under the
obligation of arms control agreements and can operate freely. In terms of competing with United
States military domination, Russia is not too far behind either. While the United States share of
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"Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense ..." Accessed June 7, 2019.

2

Chomsky, Noam. "Imperial Grand Strategy." In Hegemony or Survival, 11-12.
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major arms exports comprises of 36%, Russia stands at 21%. 3 A dominant pattern to observe that
has various implications for the United States is that despite Russia’s declining sales over the past
five years it remains the second-largest arms exporter. Moreover, it has various programs running
to modernize their weapons and further boost its weapons industry as well.
The shift from a unipolar world order to a multipolar stage is faced by various competitors
challenging the United States military industrial base and expanding their own global market share.
This shift and fear of losing more dominance is evident in the United States National Defense
Strategy too, which itself has experienced changes over the past two decades. The official rhetoric
of the National Defense strategy of 2002 draws a picture representing how the strength of U.S
forces restrict other countries from maximizing their military power. But on the other hand, as
compared to the National Defense Strategy of 2018 the rise of fear is evident within the U.S policy.
The report states that the United States is facing a global disorder which has also further caused a
challenge for its long-standing international order and more importantly, the erosion of its military
advantage too. The acknowledgement of the complex global security order by the U.S National
Defense Strategy raises various questions regarding the future actions of the once global power
and its various implications for military power and arms trade. 4

3

Abramson, Jeff. "U.S. Leads Rising Global Arms Trade."

4

The National Security Strategy - U.S. Department of State." Accessed April 20, 2019.
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
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Considering these shifts, this study examines the United States eroding global military
advantage and whether there is a way back. It covers a genealogy of the established power
regarding the globalization of the defense industrial complex and the changing global security
order. A few case-studies are used as a tool to understand the process of shift in U.S arms trade in
terms of its trading partners diversifying their options and lastly, evaluating the national defense
strategy. The thesis reviews national defense strategy, the ineffective policies that led to the erosion
of global military might and finally concludes whether there is a way back to establish a monopoly
in the globalized defense industrial complex.

Global Military Advantage
This study defines global military advantage in terms of how the United States was an
uncontested power within the international order, exercising its influence, aggression and force
posture without the presence of competition. It now faces challenges as the changing security
environment with the rising inter-state competition, and regional powers like China and Russia are
actively competing with the U.S. In addition to that, the reemergence of revisionist powers poses
a threat to the existing order of alliances thus, bringing about a shift in alliances.
It is important to observe the trend of global activities to understand how U.S global
military superiority is not decreasing in monetary terms; therefore, the sales and profits can reflect
an increase for the defense industry. But the United States influence, and exercise of power is the
main determinant for measuring the erosion of its military influence. According to SIPRI
Yearbook 2019 on armaments, disarmament and international security military spending, arms
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transfers, and the incidence of armed conflict worldwide has been on the rise.

But more

specifically the United States has paved its way to strategic nuclear renewal, whereby it is
enhancing and modernizing nuclear weapons as well as expanding its program of ballistic missile
defense. Tracking these trends, it can easily be concluded that the U.S global military advantage
is not subject to erosion however; the erosion is measured in terms of its positioning within the
international security environment and the extent to which it can influence other states.
The recent drift into global instability was observed in 2018 by continuing tensions
between the West and Russia, a US-China trade war was on the rise and the power struggle
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, pitching them on opposite sides of the armed conflicts in Iraq,
Syria and Yemen. This thesis revolves around the main concept that US global military lead is
decreasing in terms of dominance which refers to how various countries opt for trading with other
key states that are non-U. S allies. Even though the United States yields great profits in terms of
arms sales nevertheless, it is no longer in the position to use force against countries, such as the
case of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian arms affecting U.S sales.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

The following section will present an interplay of various theories and existing discourse
in the context of how they dominate the field of international relations. The broader debate will
engage the theory of realism, neorealist theory and deterrence theory. The narrowed down
literature on United States global military advantage will provide two divisions of work, firstly; a
case for the U.S military power, and secondly an alternative study against the topic. The debate
against the U.S military power includes the new international order, erosion of the global military
edge, the case against U.S arms monopoly and the risk factors causing inefficiency within the
American military industrial complex. The category providing alternative literature includes the
trends in U.S defense activities and enhancing the U.S military-industrial complex.
The theory of realism dominated the Cold War period and depicts international affairs as a
constant struggle of power, with bleak hope to avoid conflict and war. The United States long
status of a global hegemon being challenged portrays the struggle of power clearly. Classical
realists such as Morgenthau represent a raw picture of realism, whereby states possess an ‘innate
desire to dominate others’ like human nature. He further examined the multipolar balance-ofpower system and characterized the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet as
dangerous. Yet, in today's world despite having various powers competing within the multipolar
international order is still seen to be dangerous as countries like China, Russia and India are
increasingly growing, challenging the United States as a global hegemon.
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In contrast to the theory of realism, Kenneth Waltz neorealist theory is better applicable in
the interstate competition dominating today's security environment. Waltz explanation of the
international system identified by various great powers, each seeking for survival draws a clear
picture of how the American hegemony has been challenged by other powers and therefore, each
great power is attempting to survive. The United States eroding global military power cannot be
observed in isolation and therefore, its connection with the former as a global power is necessary
to make. 5 The United States as the only global power was to quite an extent characterized by its
uncontested dominance. This type of dominance allowed it to exercise power in whatever way that
best served its interest. The National Defense Strategy 2018, explicitly outlines, ‘We could
generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how
we wanted. Today, every domain is contested - air, land, sea, space and cyberspace’. Not only does
the Defense Strategy acknowledge the competition it faces but also how it is widespread in every
domain where power can be utilized. Therefore, Waltz idea of power and survival by great powers
is evident within policy-making and strategies in today's competitive security environment. 6
The United States uses the policy of force and hard power to maintain its status-quo in the
international security environment. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether the use of hard power
creates deterrence or has the United States observed a pattern of balancing powers by utilizing the
use of force. Stephen Quackenbush’s work on deterrence theory sees the use of threat by various
states as a tool to maintain the status quo whereas Frank Zagare regards the deterrence theory as

5

Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18,
no. 4 (1988): 615-28. doi:10.2307/204817.
6

The National Security Strategy - U.S. Department of State." Accessed April 20, 2019.
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an offshoot of the balance of power theory. William Kaufmann also attempts to evaluate that when
two states exercise equal power, each one of them will be deterred thus, neither will be able to gain
an advantage on the other state.

7

But, the question of how relevant deterrence is in today's

international order is still very relevant, considering deterrence might be the problem and not the
solution. In hope of exercising deterrence as power, military domination for each state has become
a primary concern therefore, inter-state competition being at rise.

New International Order
Moving along the years, recent work in the field of international studies has witnessed
various patterns of change. The changing nature of war, conflict, power, and global security order
is also presented in Joseph Nye’s work on Changing Nature of World Power. Nye unpacks the
new international order which is no more dominated by military power rather, economic,
educational and technological power is seen to play a more dominant role. Robert Keohane also
agrees with Nye on the crucial role of multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations,
and global financial markets in international politics. 8
Various contemporary scholars have also stressed upon the dramatic growth of economic
interdependence in terms of international trade and capital flows serving as a tool for political

7

Kaufmann, William W., "The Requirements of Deterrence"1945 November 15. Henry A. Kissinger Papers,
Part II (MS 1981). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
8

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age." In
Governance.com: Democracy in the Information Age, edited by Kamarck Elaine Ciulla and Nye Joseph S.,
161-78. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
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cooperation and in addition to that, also a means to expand power. Moreover, widespread literature
focuses on the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict and on
the political economy of economic sanctions.’ Jean and Edward in their article on the Political
Economy of National Security: Economic statecraft, interdependence, and international conflict
present the interlinkage between international economic and military conflict which is crucial to
the political economy of national security. Various aspects of this economic-military collaboration
have been advanced, firstly is that interstate hostilities are inhibited by trade agreements in the
international market and further also limit the chances of territorial expansion and foreign
aggression. Trade expansion can benefit the political economy however, in case of increased trade
barriers the space for economic conflicts can also lead to a political-military disagreement.

9

The economic-military nexus can also be observed in the United States Defense Strategy.
Despite desperate efforts being made by the American government to curtail the erosion of its
global military edge, various countries such as Turkey and Russia are engaging in military trade
that is hampering the American corporations such as Lockheed Martin and United Technologies.
Therefore, the political economy of national security and economic sanctions in the case of the
U.S is an important aspect to explore for understanding how the military might is being damaged.
Turkey best fits as an example of the interplay between the political economy of national security
and economic sanctions. Its recent military spending has increased by 24% in 2018 to $19 billion.

Jean‐Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield & Norrin M. Ripsman (1999) The political economy of
national security: Economic statecraft, interdependence, and international conflict, Security Studies, 9:1-2, 114, DOI: 10.1080/09636419908429393
9
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Among the world’s top 15 military spenders, this is observed to be the highest annual percentage
rise. 10
Moreover, the political economy of sanctions has played a crucial role between U.S-Turkey
ties since, Turkey is advancing towards buying Russian S-400 missile defense system. According
to Washington the S-400 lacks compatibility with NATO systems and therefore, threatens
Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets - as Turkey could be a potential buyer and partner in production.
This not only highlights the conflict of interests within the globalized military-industrial complex,
but also symbolizes the power of international corporations in the security environment.
Furthermore, Washington has threatened Turkey of potential economic sanctions in case Turkey
does not back down from the deal.
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The nexus of economic interests and sanctions shapes the

United States force posture towards other states in guarding its own interests in order to boost its
global military dominance. Nonetheless, its force posture and use of hard power in terms of
sanctions might not be the best strategy to overcome its eroding global military power.

Erosion of Global Military Advantage
The discourse in the field of international relations has witnessed debates regarding the
decline of the United States military power. Not only academic and scholarly work reflect the

10

Mehta, Aaron. "Here's How Much Global Military Spending Rose in 2018." Defense News. April 29, 2019.
https://www.defensenews.com/global/2019/04/28/heres-how-much-global-military-spending-rose-in-2018/.
11

"Turkey Not Distancing Itself from NATO with Russian Missiles Deal:" Reuters. May 03, 2019. Accessed
June 07, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-usa-security/turkey-not-distancing-itself-from-natowith-russian-missiles-deal-minister-idUSKCN1S90OB.
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decline of the United States military power but also the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the
United States acknowledges the erosion of their competitive military edge within the international
order. It identifies how terrorism is no more the main concern rather, inter-state competition has
implications for its national security. Therefore, the threat to America’s global military advantage
is important to understand to predict the long-term security environment. The erosion of the
American military supremacy is witnessed not in the shifting global market share rather, the rise
of competition it faces from revisionist powers.
Even though the United States still is the number one military expenditure, other countries
such as China and Russia are also competing at a fast rate.

12

The following figure reflects how

Russia and China’s military spending has been increasing over the years. China has been
continuously increasing its military spending and its spending is ten times more now than it was
in 1994, therefore, the United States being number one in military spending cannot be viewed in
isolation.

13

It is important to compare and consider other countries and their trajectory of arms

sales and military power to determine how the U.S military power is in decline.

12

The National Security Strategy - U.S. Department of State." Accessed April 20, 2019.
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
13

Wezeman, Siemon T. "China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales." SIPRI. Accessed June 10,
2019.
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Figure 1: Russian and Chinese Military Spending 1998-2015

The United States leading global arms trade also allows it to achieve diplomatic and
security objectives within regions but considering that other countries such as Russia and China
are also leading within the global market, the former faces drastic change in terms of competition.
There are various countries where Russia and the U.S both compete for absolute monopoly, and
the latter is observed to face tough competition. In the case of India, Russia remains the top arms
supplier whereas the U.S holds second position. To maneuver the strong hold on India as a trading
partner, the U.S wants to exercise its diplomatic efforts in restricting Russia’s control within the
market. Overall, the decline of U.S military power is on its rise, at the same time it is important to
question whether strategic policy-making can be fruitful in paving the way back to the international

18

order where the United States was the only power possessing absolute monopoly and superiority.
14

The Case Against U.S Arms Monopoly
Christopher Coyne in his work on The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly presents how
the U.S being the dominant player in the global arms market yields various benefits. The monopoly
allows it to balance global and regional stability as well as safeguard its own national interests and
domestic economic interests. The arms sales are not only a monetary gain for the U.S, but also acts
as a geopolitical tool whereby selling weapons to foreign nation states, the U.S establishes ties
with other regimes and thus, secures its national interests and policy objectives. Coyne expands
the notion of arms sales into the idea of how the U.S utilizes weapon sales as a payment to
safeguard strategic commodities such as oil and other assets like military bases.
United States achieves its interests through multiple means. Coyne refers to military bases
as one of those means to address its interests and make strategic choices. Utilizing various military
bases acts as U.S attempts to expand and promote its influence within different regions. The
complexity of political landscape within different regions compels United States to establish its
military presence. With U.S military bases established in different regions it enables it to retain its
forward presence. In East Asia and Europe, it already has military presence however, it further
expands its presence across Southeast Asia and Middle East as its key economic and political

14

Mehta, Aaron. "Here's How Much Global Military Spending Rose in 2018." Defense News. April 29, 2019.
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interests’ surface within the region. The perspectives put forward in the report on U.S. Overseas
Military Presence by RAND Corporation suggests how the U.S would need to expand its hold in
Asia to deter Chinese and North Korean military expansion whereas, in the Middle East the same
formula would be applied against Iran. But despite using the same formula, it can be observed that
within today’s political environment Syria is another key concern. Meanwhile, in Europe the U.S
had NATO allies and partners to reassure any potential threats but, with the changing security
environment NATO members such as Turkey also pose a threat in terms of Russia’s influence over
key NATO members. Saudi Arabia and India are also key allies in maneuvering for the U.S in
times of military response, but China’s economic investments and the state of dependency created
by China will raise security concerns for the U.S influence. 15
Coyne further identifies the principal-agent problem for the U.S when carrying out arms
sales to other governments and groups. Though, the U.S attempts in maximizing its power within
regions and to achieve its foreign policy goals, it overlooks the process of monitoring once
transferred. Therefore, despite selling weapons to allies it fails to investigate how the weapons can
be utilized and be transferred to other states that may achieve anti-American interests thus,
undermining the U.S dominant superiority in the international security environment. An example
that best reflects the principal-agent problem is U.S supply of over $47 million in arms to Israel
which ended up in Nahum Manbar, an Israeli businessman involved in providing information and
supplies for chemical weapons to Iran. 16

Lynn E. and Melanie W., “Looming Strategic Choices for U.S. Overseas Military Presence,” RAND
Corporation, September 11, 2012, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1211.html
15

16

Coyne, Christopher J., and Abigail R. Hall. "The Case against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly." SSRN Electronic
Journal, 2013. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2326060.
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Risk Factors Affecting America’s Industrial Base
The Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base report presented by Interagency Task
Force explores the macro forces that are identified as the root causes of the declining industrial
base. The five risk factors highlighted are sequestration and uncertainty of U.S government
spending, decline of U.S manufacturing base capabilities and capacity, deleterious U.S
government business and procurement practices, industrial policies of competitor nations and
lastly, diminishing U.S STEM and trade skills. The most important aspects are firstly, the U.S
government spending in terms of uncertainty about future budgets as well as the government
expenditure which therefore, creates market instability.
Secondly, the decline of the U.S manufacturing base capabilities and capacity is another
significant factor contributing to the decline, in terms of hampered production resulting in spiraling
effect on supply chain. Therefore, within the globalized defense industrial complex a reduced
supply by the American industrial base has already led to other competitors capturing potential
trading partners thus, resulting in the slow-poisoning erosion of U.S military advantage. The gap
between the globalized rising demand and supply will allow other competitors to sell at a lower
price. Furthermore, the decline of U.S manufacturing sector which is not only the backbone of U.S
military technical ability, but also contributes to the economy; 9% of employment, 12% of GDP,
60% of exports, 55% of patents and 70% of research and development – thus, will damage the
economic production at a great scale. 17

17

"Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense ..." Accessed June 7, 2019.
https://www.govinfo.gov/metadata/granule/FR-2017-07-26/2017-15860/mods.xml.
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The third factor which is yet the most important factor is the industrial policies of
competitor nations, such as China. It is important to mention that almost half of U.S trade deficit
in goods is with China, which was for $375 billion in 2017. Many countries have managed to
target United States industrial base, but China has been the most successful in boosting their
economy at the expense of America’s manufacturing sector. The role of China’s economic
expansion is a crucial threat to U.S military power regarding the former adopting military
modernization as well which is codified in its civil-military fusion. This type of fusion is much
different from the strategies adopted by the U.S to maintain its power within regions, since along
military modernization China has developed its infrastructural bases across Eurasia which allows
it to expand its military might too. Therefore, understanding China’s economic growth is essential
in comprehending its military modernization since the finance gained from growth is utilized for
military expansion. It is important to note the U.S trade deficit is in terms of overall goods and not
limited to defense goods but, despite that the economic deficit impacts the U.S economy at large.
China’s economic growth has a directly proportional relationship with its military budget.
China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 with a gross domestic growing more than
300%, jumping from $2.4 trillion to $10.2 trillion in 2017 whereas; the U.S real gross domestic
product grew only less than 40% i.e. from $12.8 trillion to $17.3 trillion. (Figure 1)
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Figure 2: China's Gross Domestic Growth (post joining WTO)

Comparing economic growth to military budget reflects how both these variables have a positive
impact on each other. From 2001 till 2007 China’s annual military budget rose from $20 billion to
$150 billion. According to one of the findings of the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base
report presented by Interagency Task Force China is progressing and growing the risk it places on
the supply of materials and technologies which are strategically crucial to the national security of
the United States. The areas that threaten America’s defense industrial base are specific metals,
alloys and some magnets. 18
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China’s rapid technological advancement and its trade war with the U.S accompanied by
its aggressive trade and infrastructural policies like the One Belt, One Road Initiative threaten the
U.S global military advantage. On the other hand, China is benefited with an exercise of control
in diplomatic and security objectives; a privilege that the U.S enjoyed within the rules-based
international order. With the erosion of the global military might and rise of inter-state competition
U.S can be observed to losing its position in exercising uncontested dominance within the
international order.

Trends in U.S Global Defense Activities
U.S defense is characterized by a few dominant trends. Firstly, the U.S defense spending
is rising, and more revenue generation is expected, yet trends show a decline in the rise itself. The
defense budget increased by more than 10% in fiscal year 2018 to $590 billion but, in the fiscal
year 2019 the defense industry observed a rise of only 3% to $606 billion. Therefore, the difference
in the rise of defense budget and the pace it grows at depends on multiple factors such as, which
segment of the market is targeted for growth and what strategic decisions are taken by companies.
Overall, the long-term growth possibility is uncertain due to political issues. These political issues
range from India and Turkey’s strengthening trade ties with Russia, China’s economic investments
in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. But at the same time, Saudi regimes ties with the U.S is of a
great deal in terms of arms trade and in support for U.S against Iran. Despite, increasing threats
from rivals like Russia and China which push the U.S for a stronger military there has been growth
in fiscal deficit which could also limit defense spending in the future.
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Secondly, the U.S still wants to specialize in advanced technology at an economical cost
despite overall increased defense spending. Many contractors have also been demanding suppliers
to reduce costs therefore, most companies have worked towards their cost structures with an aim
of being more competitive, but even then, most of these savings trickle down to customers limiting
material advancement in profits. Thirdly, another trend observed is that companies within the
defense sector have increased mergers and acquisitions activity and this is seen to rise in the
coming years. An example of mergers is Harris Corp. and L3 Technologies Inc., meanwhile, other
large prime contractors such as Boeing, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin continue to acquire
smaller companies to expand new technologies. The defense industry remains competitive and
though the competition can be productive, it also causes inefficiency at a national scale. The
section on competition and centralization which generates inefficiency of the U.S arms industry
causing the erosion of the global military advantage will be further unpacked in detail.
Lastly, an overall decline in global economy is observed and even though the U.S defense
industry is not affected by short-term economic conditions, an international slowing down of
economic activity and the demand from other states can have a negative impact on the U.S arms
trade.
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Sustaining and Enhancing the U.S Military’s Technological Edge
Flournoy and Robert’s work on how US can sustain and enhance its military’s
technological superiority provides an alternate approach to the research topic.

20

The argument

presented in this thesis is most relevant to Flournoy and Robert’s work which provides both sides
of the topic. The factors influencing erosion, and how the military power can be preserved, restored
and enhanced. Nonetheless, the gap within the literature remains which is addressed in this thesis;
whether there is a way back to the erosion of the United States global military edge?
It regards how the successful process of sustaining and enhancing its military technological
effect will contribute to the restoration of the global military might. The author expands how the
United States has been superior in terms of its military and technological advantage over its
competitors for decades. Its technological skill set and the Department of Defense role’s efficiency
in developing and integrating new, cutting-edge capabilities which include C4SIR, network
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance has
been a crucial mode of strength.
Despite all the positives, the paper further moves on to unfold the new challenges. The
United States can no longer completely rely on its military and technological power. There are
various reasons and challenges that have changed the status-quo of America’s military industrial
complex. Firstly, competitors like China and Russia are heavily investing in their military and
technological base in order to compete directly with the U.S military might. China is not only
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specializing in military strength but also broadening its economic power through its Belt and Road
initiative (BRI) development project.
The effort to sustain and enhance the US military and technological might is already in the
process. The U.S has explicitly outlined in its National Defense Strategy that it needs to counter
the inter-state competition which is now its primary concern compared to terrorism that defined
the last decade in terms of U.S national security interest. The steps taken now to sustain its existing
military edge and further enhance it will affect the future international order. Flournoy and Robert
provide ten actions that can be strategized to protect US military superiority.
Firstly, to create a sense of urgency within the DOD. This strategy focuses on the
departments clear vision and urgent action on sustaining US military might. In order to promote
the protection and enhancement the strategy recommends defense leaders create a ‘team of teams’
approach which is somewhat like the Joint Special Operations Task Force mode. This approach
can be utilized to set a shared goal for innovation and translating the decentralized decisionmaking. Secondly, to build the momentum of already existing DOD efforts. This would allow
implementing a third “offset strategy”. This would focus on preserving the US military might in
terms of global power projection. The momentum on this strategy should be maintained and
pursued continuously. Thirdly, to create a healthy competition which works on the challenges the
U.S would face in the coming decades. This being a very crucial factor, further expanded in this
thesis regarding the damaging effects of reduced competition within the United States defense
industry.
Another strategy is to ‘eliminate the barriers between those who define requirements, those
who acquire systems, and those who will ultimately use them.’ That expands on how there should
27

be coordination and communication between different communities representing the same agenda.
Moreover, the problem of competition between the US military industrial complex needs to be
addressed by ‘creating a safe space for deeper dialogue and engagement with industry, both
traditional defense industry and commercial companies.’ This would allow collaborative brainstorming and innovation possible. Currently, it is difficult for DOD officials to have a healthy
dialogue with leaders from within the industry about various problems being faced by the U.S
military and explore any possible solutions. The increase of investment in activities that drive
innovation would also serve as a tool to protect the US military superiority.
Moreover, the author identifies enhancement of ‘DOD’s ability to work with the most
innovative companies in the commercial tech sector’ as a strategy that can yield positive outcomes.
The increase in more rapid and flexible acquisition authorities to accelerate acquisition is vital but
even then, requires government plans and more incentives. Empowering professionals throughout
the stages of the process and further, strengthen accountability for performance in acquisition is
yet another booster for sustaining the defense capabilities. This will lead to the improvement of
DOD’s ability to provide war-fighting capabilities. Lastly, to support and accelerate congressional
effort in order to reform the acquisition system.
The U.S cannot succeed in sustaining and enhancing military and technological strength
unless a healthier and balanced defense budget is created that allows expanded innovation and
acquisition. To protect the national security interest of the United States it is crucial to uphold and
enhance the U.S military’s technological edge. 21
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This paper will qualitatively examine a set of documents and data available for addressing
the research question. It will draw much of its findings through document analysis from U.S
government websites such as the U.S Department of Defense. Furthermore, the documents would
include public military power publications, national defense strategies, annual reports and
publications. This thesis will also explore the economics of the U.S defense industry in terms of
various important companies such as Raytheon, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin. It will categorize
how profit-seeking corporations have a great contribution in the defense industrial complex as well
as the erosion of dominance over the years. Lastly, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute database will be used to measure top importers and exporters of arms trade as well as to
observe changes in the patterns of trade.
Considering the information available as well as data limitations, this thesis relies heavily
on document analysis that are available in open sources. This thesis clearly illustrates the erosion
of U.S military dominance and how it has evolved as a process over the decades. It aims to use
relevant findings from government documents, multiple corporations’ annual reports and SIPRI’s
databases to explore whether the U.S can regain its uncontested military dominance.

Limitations
Research on the defense industry of the United States of America is often faced by data
constraints. Various limitations are due to the sensitivity of national security and thus, researchers
utilize a mix of strategies to explore the field of arms trade and patterns. Detailed information
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regarding arms supply, trade and deals lacks transparency and accountability. Therefore, this
research is also faced by similar challenges.
The nature of this research requires careful observation and data analysis of information
related to military and national security. It is prone to various limitations which defines this study.
Firstly, the existing literature indicates that research on this topic does not provide hidden vestedinterests and costs of various arms sales. These vested-interests refer to loopholes that are not
addressed in open source data. For e.g. why the United States sells weapons to undemocratic
regimes such as, Saudi Arabia. Therefore, a major aspect of U.S military dominance cannot be
explored.
Secondly, this research is also restricted based on a given time-frame. It lasts roughly six
months to a year therefore; this research is outlined in multiple phases. It introduces the
globalization of the defense industrial complex, and further addresses the changing strategic
security environment at the international scale; the reemergence of revisionist powers threatening
the existing international order. Moreover, it explores various shifts in the U.S arms trade, analyzes
the U.S defense industry’s capabilities and evaluates the U.S national defense strategy before
presenting the findings to determine if there is a process to regain the military power and if so,
what strategies can be utilized.
Lastly field work is not explored as an option within this research. The United States
military dominance and its process of erosion is a sensitive topic and is of national interest.
Therefore, experts within the field refrain from providing information which isn’t already available
to the public.
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Chapter 4: Case-studies

The following section explores whether United States global military edge is eroding or
not. Two main case-studies analyzed within this section are China and Russia. A detailed
examination of these case-studies is carried out to investigate defense policies, trends of their
military sales and the impact it has on shifting allegiances in the international order leading to the
erosion of U.S military presence. These case-studies define whether the erosion of American
global military presence is a permanent phenomenon or not. This research will further determine
whether there is a way back or not; and if there is a way back what are the strategies that can be
adopted to restore or sustain the U.S military power and presence within the international order.
Despite enjoying decades of powerful military influence with added technological
advantage, the U.S now does face competition by its adversaries. United States is no longer the
superpower that could exercise its military strength almost in every domain. It faces pressure from
powers like China and Russia, both heavily investing in their military industrial base with an aim
of countering U.S military power and, addressing U.S vulnerabilities within different regions.22
Each of the case-study within this section will target the countries positioning to be a
competitive threat to the United States. The first case-study is China which explores military sales
and presence of China in Asia, Middle East and Africa. It will cover firstly, the defense strategy
of China over the past decade before moving on to the analysis of its decade long strategy shift.
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Secondly, it will unpack China’s economic expansion and its Belt Road initiative to be a tool of
undercover military expansion.
The second case-study is of Russia which unpacks a brief introduction of Russia’s defense
industry in terms of how it competes within the global market with the United States. It addresses
the comparison between both competitors in terms of what the Russian arms offer that the U.S
arms don’t. It further examines its military presence in Eurasia, specifically in Turkey and India.
The former being a NATO member and a not so accepted ally of the United States anymore. In
contrast to Turkey, India being a key ally of the U.S. Both cases investigate Russian military
advancement within the latter’s defense market.

A. China
China’s process and growth over the years has seen various shifts and trends in terms of its
economic and defense policy. China was the second biggest spender in 2018, account falling
within the 60% of global military spending.23 It can be classified into three phases beginning from
2010 till 2019. The three phases that are examined within this research range from 2008-2010,
2010-2014 and 2014-2019.
These time ranges broadly explore China’s overall growth, and specifically study its
defense strategy. Each phase investigates the defense policy changes and China’s fundamental
security interests in terms of the changing security environment within the international order.
Each phase is identified by a certain trend. China’s 2010 defense policy is characterized by
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strategic economic opportunities however, an overall favorable security environment. Following
2014’s defense policy, dominated by unprecedented challenges while being at a critical stage of
reform and development. A key trend to observe was China’s goal to be able to carry out a counternuclear attack. Both phases witnessed a balanced defense policy with an aim to strengthen China’s
defense base and resist aggression but specifically, the defense policy of 2019 identifies a ‘New
Era’ whereby the international military is undergoing historic changes. It characterizes US as a
provoking agent to rising competition and incorporates the changing nature of war whereby, the
development of technology in the military field is seen as a must.

China’s Defense Policy 2010
China’s defense policy in 2010 was a period characterized by strategic economic
opportunities, and an overall favorable security environment. It was successful to counter its
financial crisis and maintained a balanced economic growth. At a regional scale it was reinforcing
cordial relations with neighboring countries. Its defense strategy remained defensive in nature. It
focused on China’s modernization through building and laying the foundations of a strong national
defense and armed forces. Despite having a defense strategy that was defensive in nature, it was
determined by a development path. Its fundamental aim was to defend national security interest
in terms of resisting aggression and protecting China’s lands, inland waters, territorial waters,
airspace, maritime rights and cyberspace.
China’s security challenges are complex in nature due to its vast territories and territorial
seas. Therefore, despite possessing steady economic growth and balanced security environment
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the 2010 National Defense Policy identifies Taiwan’s independence as its biggest obstacle. The
separatist forces and their activities were perceived as a threat to China in terms of its cross-Strait
relations. Even though progress regarding adhering 1992 consensus (recognizing One China)
enhanced mutual trust and bilateral terms, it still regards Taiwan as a threat to its defense.
China’s Defense Policy of 2010 not only recognized Taiwan as a threat rather, explicitly
identifies the United States heavily hampering Sino-US relations by selling weapons to Taiwan.
It perceives that the United States is damaging the peaceful security environment of cross-Strait
relations. 24

China’s Defense Policy 2014
China’s defense policy in 2014 labeled the world facing unprecedented challenges. It
recognized China being at a critical stage of reform and development. Very different from the
defense policy of 2010, the Chinese dream was highlighted as pursuing a peaceful development
path whereby, a stable security environment would provide China with greater opportunities.
However, along the era of reform and development China aimed to stick to its independent foreign
policy, and a defense policy that is defensive in nature in order to pave its way in opposing
hegemony and power politics. The 2014 policy outlines China’s unwillingness to seek expansion.
China’s military strategy was to adapt with the changing security environment by strongly
adhering to the goal of the Communist Party of China to build a solid military that can counter
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every new situation. It focused on modernizing of national defense and its armed forces in order
to safeguard China’s sovereignty, national security and economic development interests. China’s
2014 defense policy associates the global order being multi-polar and economic globalization
accelerating to Asia-Pacific regions, whereas the US is on its effort to rebalance the security
environment in the region. China’s territorial and maritime interests are of key concern and thus,
considering these factors China plans to build a stronger and more secure defense strategy.
The 2014 defense policy unpacks various strategic tasks, out of which the most thoughtprovoking is to deal with military threats and be able to carry out a counter-nuclear attack. Despite
from what the defense policy enunciates, it is not guaranteed whether China would use its nuclear
power for countering purpose only. The trend of adapting to new security challenges is a sign to
predict that China can change its defense policy from defensive posture to a force posture.
The changing circumstances and conditions need to be predicted, in order to assess when
and how China would switch its posture from defensive to an aggressive one. These shifting
conditions and adaptation to new security challenges also include that, ‘The PLA Navy will
enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint
operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive support’ which is now evident in
its logistic base in Djibouti.
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The case of Djibouti and how Chinese defense strategy has

expanded beyond borders will be further analyzed within this research.
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China’s Defense Policy 2019 – In the New Era
China’s defense policy of 2019 recognizes it has entered a new era and acknowledges the
fact that the international military competition is undergoing historic changes. While it points out
various uncertainties in the international security environment and the realignment of international
powers, it also accepts the strategic competition is on the rise. With the acceptance of this
competition China prepares itself to be one of the main competitors.
The 2019 defense policy highlights how the U.S has adjusted its defense strategies and has
also, ‘provoked’ intensification of competitor. Moreover, China has managed to increase its
defense budget which now also adds on the capacity to incorporate outer space and cyber defense.
2019 Defense policy sheds light on the changing nature of war to intelligence warfare.
Furthermore, it recognizes NATO’s expansion of its military development in Central and Eastern
Europe while, Russia’s strengthening of its nuclear and non-nuclear base with the aim of strategic
containment. The policy focuses on how the military field is now being dominated by a
technological revolution whereby, the use of cutting-edge technologies, cloud computing,
quantum information, big data and artificial intelligence is becoming more mainstream. 26
While China’s distinctive feature of its national defense policy calls attention to its goal of
never seeking hegemony or expanding its sphere of influence its economic development and
investment reflects a different trend. China’s overseas direct investment has been on the rise thus,
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showing its progressive trend towards economic expansion. Figure 3 helps to explain China’s
economic expansionist agenda: 27

Figure 3: Stock of China’s Outbound Direct Investment (ODI) 2010-2014

The 2019 defense policy also outlines strategic tasks which are very different from its
previous 2014 defense policy. The fundamental goal is to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security
and its development interests. Nevertheless, the most highlighted tasks that can lead to countering
the U.S indirectly are ‘opposing and containing Taiwan independence, crack down on proponents

Dollar, David. “China as a Global Investor.” Chinas New Sources of Economic Growth: Vol. 1, 2016.
https://doi.org/10.22459/cnseg.07.2016.09
27

38

of separatist movements such as Tibet independence and the creation of East Turkestan’ and lastly,
to ‘safeguard China’s security interests in outer space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace’.

Analysis of China’s Defense Policy

Defense Posture
The defense policies of China have observed a shift since 2010. From a focus on strategic
economic opportunities and maintaining a favorable security environment, it drifted towards a
stage of reform and development, recognizing unprecedented challenges within the global security
environment. Quite opposite from the past trends, more recently its policy has observed a greater
change whereby, it now recognizes it has stepped into a ‘New Era’. Both the defense policy of
2010 and 2014, sheds light on China’s unwillingness to expand its influence. In contrary to that,
in 2019 the defense policy has accepted that the military field is going through ‘historic changes.’
In the light of these changes it is likely that China brings about more shifts in their defense policy
whereby, its economic expansion and military goals will change.
This analysis incorporates China’s future defense posture, including its economic
expansion which provides it with an edge on other countries, and expands onto how the posture
will affect and hamper U.S military advantage within the global order. According to its defense
policy the two main strategic tasks that China intends to focus on the most and regards it as a major
threat is Taiwan independence and, counter separatist movements.
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The Belt Road Initiative –An Undercover Economic-Military Project
This section will cover China’s Belt Road Initiative and the economic investments done
under the umbrella of BRI, to draw a direct connection between BRI investment and military
partnership. It investigates countries that are the beneficiaries of both economic and military
expansion. China is making efforts to further expand its presence within different regions. It has
various economic projects in the Middle-East, Asia and Africa. In Middle East it has Iran, Saudi
Arabia, U.A.E, Egypt and Israel to strengthen ties with. In Africa it has Djibouti, a key concern
for the United States.
In Asia, it mainly has Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar to explore with its
expansionist tendencies. These tendencies include economic and military investments therefore,
China’s Belt Road Initiative is directly linked to its military expansion too. Figure 4 reflects
China’s global development strategy intertwined with arms sales in Asia. Since 2007 onwards,
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar have received China’s top arms; all three countries are
beneficiaries of the Belt and Road Initiative too. According to SIPRI calculations in 2018,
Bangladesh received 75 million units of arms whereas, Myanmar received 105 million units and
Pakistan 448 units. 28
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Figure 4: Arms Exported from China 2007-2018

China is also seen to have a well-established presence in MENA countries, especially in
terms of investment. Figure 5 shows investment of $20 billion in various projects and firms by
the Chinese government since 2005. The Belt Road initiative within the graph also represents the
investment taken place. 29 China’s Belt Road Initiative launched in 2013, which is also termed as
the One Belt, One Road; it has an aim to strengthen China’s economic presence and activity
throughout the world. It not only covers vast amount of geographical area, but also includes
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infrastructural plans for various regions. It extended to 65 countries with combined GDP of $23
trillion, partnering with 4.4 billion people.

Figure 5: Chinese Investment in MENA Countries; MENA countries with more than $ 20 billion worth of investment
and construction projects by Chinese firms since 2005
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Figure 6: Belt Road Initiative Global Investment

According to the Asian Development Bank, it is noted that developing countries require
$26 trillion in infrastructure investment for the sustainability of BRI. Despite facing various
challenges, the BRI can profit heavily in terms of economic and political gains. It will lead to the
expansion of Chinese export markets, further promote the Renminbi as an international currency,
and give a leverage to China is reducing trade barriers. Based on the increased trade, investment
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and economic ties between China and other regions, it is justified to say that the entire economic
cycle will be dominated by China, allowing it to further shape the international order. 30
With the Belt Road Initiative and economic investments, it is evident that China is also
becoming a top arms dealer. It has managed to be in competition at par with U.S, Russia, Germany
and France. A very important link of military expansion and the BRI is that top customers of arms
include the BRI partners. According to SIPRI China has managed to export 16.2 billion units of
ammunition in the past twelve years. Mostly the receivers are countries in Asia, Middle East and
Africa, the same regions where the BRI is active. 31

China’s Regional Military Expansion

1. Asia
Years of economic growth with the added advantage of military modernization has enabled
China to become a key player in the global arms trade. Between 2008 and 2017, China has been
observed to export $14.4 billion worth of conventional weapons throughout the world. This made
China the 5th largest arms supplier in the world after the United States, Russia, France and
Germany. SIPRI’s data shows China’s conventional arms sales increased from $650 million in

30 China Power Team. "How will the Belt and Road Initiative advance China’s interests?" China Power. May
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2008 to $1.13 billion in 2017.32 It is also important to note, 74% of these went to Asia. Despite
these figures, the overall defense trade of China is pale in comparison to the United States. The
United States exports averaged $9 billion annually over the last ten years.
China mostly exports arms to neighboring countries. During mid-1990s and mid-2000s
82.8% exports was across Asia. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar received 62.4% of China’s
conventional weapons since 2008. Other Asian countries comprise of 11.8% of Chinese arms.
China’s arms sales have seen shifts as they rose from $386 million in 2008 to $1.5 billion in 2016,
followed by a decrease to $948 million in 2017. Economic ties to Pakistan have made way for
military ties too for China. These exchanges are often based on political objectives. Growing
cooperation amongst the two countries on counter-terrorism led to a surge in sales from $250
million in 2008 to over $750 million in 2009. The sale of a sophisticated optical tracking system
that could be used for nuclear missiles was also given out in 2018. This sale was carried out right
after India tested its Agni-V long-range ballistic missile. Other purchases also included JF-17
thunder aircraft which has been greatly appreciated by the Pakistan public and showcased on
Pakistan’s military parade. The following figure reflects Chinese arms sales across Asia through
2008-2017.33 Table 1 exhibits a breakdown of the sales made to various countries in Asia.
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Figure 7: Chinese Arms Exports to Asia 2008-2017

Pakistan

$ 6,074 million

Bangladesh

$ 2,106 million

Myanmar

$ 1,275 million

Iran

$ 367 million

Indonesia

$ 313 million

Rest of Asia

$ 1,360 million

Table 1: Breakdown of Chinese Arms Exports to Asia Countries ($ million)

The case of Pakistan-China military sales symbolizes how a shift in U.S policy has resulted
in a decline in their arms trade, and therefore given way to China to take away United States market
share. These developments were first seen during U.S sanctions on Pakistan in 1965 which led to
a rise in Chinese-Pakistan military sales. By early 1980s, 75% of tanks and 65% of Pakistan
46

Airforce aircrafts were given by the Chinese. China also had a key role in Pakistan’s nuclear
program in terms of the technology transfer. Another phase of U.S policy allowing Chinese
defense industry to overtake a segment of the U.S defense industry market share, was from 20092018 due to Trump administrations force posture. This resulted in withdrawing of U.S aid in 2018.
Therefore, again allowing the rise of Chinese arms exports in Pakistan as a result of change in U.S
foreign policy.
The following table 2 and table 3 represents the share of Chinese exports to Pakistan in the
total arms sales through 2009-2018. Despite Pakistan being the largest arms market for China, the
steady decline reflects China’s aim to diversify its arms market. China’s aim to diversify in the
global defense industry is based on its expansionist path to compete with the ‘United States for the
global superpower spot’ 34
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Table 2: Share of China and USA in arms exports to Pakistan (%) 2009-2018

Table 3: Share of Pakistan in Total Arms Exports from China (%) 2009-2018
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2. Middle East
Middle East is yet another region observed to attract Chinese investments at quite a fast pace.
It is firstly important to understand why the Middle East is such a hot cake for the global powers.
The main source is the region’s energy resources which fuel and shape economic and defense
policies of various countries. This is reflective in the estimates too, 79.4% of the world’s oil reserve
is concentrated in OPEC member countries, out of which Middle East amounts for 64.5% of the
total.35 The following figure represents a break-down of the energy reserves:

Figure 8: OPEC share of world crude oil reserves, 2018
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According to the International Energy Agency it is predicted that by 2030, China’s import
of oil will rise to at least 10 million barrels a day, the current import level of the United States.36
Therefore, the Middle East is a perfect place for China to both take its energy supply from and
further penetrate deeper in the arms sales. Currently, China’s aim is to purchase stakes in the region
through economic means. It is seen to launch development projects and improve its ties with Iran
and Saudi Arabia.
In addition to the energy resources, China is experiencing gains from the Middle East
exports. It has managed to organize itself as a key export destination therefore, diversifying its
economic options as well as paving way to shadow countries with its presence. Figure 9 shows
China’s entry in Middle Eastern economic markets as top five export destination. An important
pattern seen here is that Israel, an American ally has also carried out exports to China worth $ 4.6
billion in 2018. Despite the U.S being the top destination, China is also a fast-growing trade partner
for Israel. 37
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Figure 9: Exports to China from MENA Countries; China has emerged as a vital export destination for several
countries in the Middle East and North Africa. For these countries above, China made the top five in 2018 38

China is observed to be developing its ties with individual countries rather than the entire
region. As Chinese economy expands, the country’s demand for energy also increases. Therefore,
China sees the Middle East as an important region to explore. It has five principal partners in the
region; Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Israel. This paper closely examines
China’s Middle East model, in terms it’s grand strategy for the region for Iran and Saudi Arabia.
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This grand strategy includes narrowed down focused objectives with each of the individual
countries in the region. 39

a) Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is China’s largest trading partner in West Asia. Furthermore, various Chinese
construction firms are assisting Saudi Arabia in building infrastructure. On the other hand, Saudi
Arabia is also interested in building tailor made refineries and petrochemical production facilities
within China. It seems that Saudi Arabia is using China as a tap on western oil consumption as
well as western influence in Saudi Arabia. 40 41
While there is economic cooperation amongst the two countries, there is also military trade
and partnership. While $65 billion have been agreed to invest in joint ventures, the sale of
intermediate range (3000 km) ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia by China are also seen to be a part
of ‘China card’.42 China’s military relations with Saudi Arabia have been developing more
significantly. One of these interests is reflected in Saudi Arabia’s Air Force utilizing Chinese
UAVs. Together, their militaries are also holding counter-terrorism exercises in Western China; it
is important to note these are exercises the former would conduct with the U.S military previously.
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Recently, the Saudi port of Jeddah was paid a visit by the Chinese navy vessels, a step towards
impacting conditions in the Gulf of Aden, a vital water route especially for Persian Gulf oil. 43
China’s arms exports have been on the increase since 2018. That is a trend seen since the
past 15 years, allowing China to become one of the largest arms suppliers. Out of more than $25
billion worth of arms sales, $10 billion of it comprises of military equipment to the Middle East
with Saudi Arabia accounting for it too along with other countries such as U.A.E and Iraq.
Moreover, China’s market for armed UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicle) has been on the growth,
Saudi Arabia is a receiver of CAIHONG, a series of its UAVs. 44
Furthermore, satellite images first presented by Jane’s Defense Weekly in mid-2013,
analyzed by Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, suggest that Saudi Arabia
had made its ballistic missile factory which brings the Kingdoms nuclear ambitions in the
limelight. Despite being a U.S ally the factory at a missile base in al-Watah is under suspicion
based on China providing the ballistic missiles. According to the institute’s analyst, the Saudi
engine test stand was like a Chinese one. The result after the analysis of the satellite imagery were
that, ‘China partially covers the flame shooting out of the engine and cools the test building with
water, so it does not catch fire. The Saudi test complex appears to replicate that setup…’
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Moreover, another factor that raises the question of United States military advantage being
challenged not only by China, but also its own allies. Despite Saudi Arabia’s request being turned
down by the U.S for purchasing category-one American drones, which included the Predator and
Reapers due to Missile Technology Control Regime regulations; the former approached China to
purchase drones followed by a deal of a drone factory build in Saudi Arabia by the Chinese.
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This factory would produce a replica of the Predator. These efforts are reflective of Saudi Arabia’s
inclination towards a military buildup that too, more diversified and in partnership with other
countries other than its closest ally, the United States. It is a way forward towards military
partnership with other regional powers, therefore Saudi Arabia is an example of how the U.S allies
opt for alternatives for military might and explore the options that are direct competitors of the
United States military industrial complex.

b) Iran
China has arrived in the Middle East and is observed to be making efforts in establishing
its economic presence within the region. It has the power to shape regional markets which comes
with the cost of regional security arrangement. The main concern within the region is Iran, a
trading partner of China within the global defense industry.46 A benefit for China and a negative
for the region itself that China now possesses the power to rearrange security environment within
the Middle East.
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The Chinese-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership 2016 represents a shift in the
international order and balance of power. The fundamental pillar of the deal was the investment of
$280bn in developing Iran’s oil, gas and petrochemical sector. Moreover, it classified another $120
billion investment in Iran’s infrastructure. This heavily invested economic interests in Iran require
security and protection in the light of current U.S sanctions on Iran. China is a regional power and
would not risk to invest in a country without any incentives therefore, the Chinese have included
5,000 Chinese security personnel within Iran to safeguard Chinese investments. The deployment
of these security personnel has been pictured in protecting economic interests, but in fact are a
symbolization of the economic-military expansion China is carrying out specific and unique in
every region.
Additional personnel are expected to be deployed with added material available for the
smooth transition of oil, gas and petrochemicals from Iran to China. China believes the
development of Iran’s infrastructure is in line with its Belt Road Initiative. This will allow China
to exploit cheap Iranian labor as well. The infrastructural development also includes a 2300 km
New Silk Road which provides China with access to Iran from Urumqi, which further extends to
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and finally via Turkey into Europe.47
This economic and infrastructural investment is seen to come along with military presence,
characterized as ‘security personnel’ to protect the economic interests of Chinese investments.
Furthermore, China is seen to expand its inter-regional economic and military influence whereby
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not only it allows itself for troops to be deployed but, also Chinese companies and projects. China
admits these projects are a part of the Belt Road Initiative. The BRI is observed to be more than
just an economic initiative. Rather it reflects to act as an infrastructural tool to economic
colonization with an added slow-paced military presence.
Iran’s military relationship with China can be dated back to the mid 1980’s when China
sold Iran anti-ship cruise missiles in different phases. These missiles included the Silkworm (HY2), the C-801 and C-802. It seems China’s intentions have further expanded now. China is also
observed to sell surface-to-surface cruise missiles as well as assisting the country in long-range
ballistic missiles.
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In 2003 the CIA issued a report on China’s record of proliferation activities

which highlighted that China along with Russia and North Korea were helping Iran’s in their
ballistic missile program. 49 Beijing has also played a part of Iran’s nuclear and chemical weapons
programs despite assuring Washington that it was not in the process of doing so. An example of
this was its supply of uranium conversion facility and nuclear power reactors to Iran. 50

3. Africa – Djibouti
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August 1, 2017 marks the day when China’s People Liberation Army established its
military presence in Djibouti, Africa. It managed to build its first military base located near the
Chinese Port of Doraleh. It is not quite far from the U.S Naval base, Camp Lemonnier. Despite,
China expressing its lack of interest in expansionist tendencies it has paved its departure smoothly
from not stationing troops in foreign countries to having a well-based military base in Djibouti.
China’s Ministry of National Defense officially confirmed its agreement with Djibouti. It
regards the base as a ‘logistical support facilities’ that would be crucial in guarding its country’s
overseas national interests. This ‘support base’ is a preliminary example of China’s economic
interests translating into infrastructural and logistical capacities resulting in its own powerprojection capabilities throughout the world.

51

The National Bureau of Asian Research’s report

on Securing the Belt and Road Initiative rightfully outlines how Chinese naval base in Djibouti is
a way forward for the country to build more bases in other regions with the changing global
security environment.
Chinese base in Djibouti is more than just a military presence in Africa, it is a shift of
policy in terms of China’s military stance and strategic identity. China’s foreign policy in the past
was characterized by the absence of Chinese military presence, however the case is not the same
anymore. Chinese Foreign Ministry has clarified the building of bases in the near future with the
aim of protecting overseas Chinese interests. It is important to note that China’s military might
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makes its way along its economic and infrastructural investments thus, creating a strong hold and
base within different regions to penetrate with its military power.
How important is the naval base in Djibouti for China? The Ministry of National Defense
has outlined three purposes the base serves. Firstly, it will be used for deployment of troops.
Secondly, it will in return provide logistical assistance to patrols, and lastly aid ‘humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.’ The future of the base is an important aspect to
be observed. Various dimensions need to be investigated to conclude whether Chinese could use
the base against its enemies. The type of operations conducted in order to protect Chinese interests
is a key concern for the security of the region. 52
Djibouti is a small piece of land but holds key strategic location. It provides a shipping
route between Asia and the Suez Canal. The economic use of the base which in turn amplifies
military presence by various countries is based on an estimated 4.8 million barrels of oil is exported
from the Bab el-Mandab a strait adjacent to the base. Djibouti is also geographically close to
Yemen which is again a very important location for the United States as it exercises its power
against Houthi militants from Yemen. 53
Over all, the successful attempt of military presence in Africa is a symbolization of
broadened Chinese national interests and challenges. As analyzed in the section above on China’s
2014 military strategy, the base in Djibouti is a real-life example and reflection of China’s
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defensive posture transitioning into an aggressive one. Its 2014 military strategy specifically
outlined, ‘adapting to new security challenges’ thus, edging it way into establishing strong military
footholds in other regions.
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B. Russia
Russia is the world’s second largest exporter of arms, right after the U.S. It has managed
to maintain and strengthen its position within the defense industry. It holds immense importance
within the global defense industry as it occupies the second position within the market, enabling it
to be a competitor of the United States defense industrial complex.
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SIPRI’s top list for trend-

indicator value of global arms exports for the year 2018 shows the second rank of Russia as a
global arms exports in table 4. 55

Table 4: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; Russia's second rank as a supplier in global arms exports for 2018
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Countries that do not share a very warm relation with the U.S in terms of arms trade
approach Russia, being a U.S competitor in the market. Various countries are served by the Russian
defense industry. Asia has positioned itself as a monopoly within the Russian defense market, as
it accounted for 70% of their exports back in 2000. Arms trade has a crucial place in Russian
economy as it contributes a large proportion of manufactured exports. Therefore, one of the main
industries in Russia, is the arms industry which is also one of the main markets in the global
defense industry. It serves as a key source for employment generation and profit yielding.
21% of global arms sales in 2016 were carried out by Russia, and this is not a new
phenomenon. Despite short-term fluctuations, Russia has maintained a competitor of the United
States and most likely will remain so in the coming future. Various phases witness shifting trends
for Russia, but it is important to note there are phases such as in 2013, Russian arms exports value
bypassed United States exports. Figure 11 below represents the share of total global arms exports
through the period of 2000-2016; highlighting that Russia accounts fall for an annual average of
25% of global exports within the entire period.
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Figure 10: Share of Total Global Arms Exports 2000-2016

Considering the share of Russian exports, it is important to break-down the broad
categories of weapon systems which lacks uniformity. The country’s global exports can be
separated into five main fields; air-defense systems, missiles, aircrafts, sensors and artillery
systems. Out of these five, the first three are the strength and the cornerstone of the Russia defense
industry. The following graphical data reflects the strength of Russia defense industry in airdefense systems, missiles and aircraft occupying 41.1%, 25.6% and 24.7% of global sales in the
period of 2010-2016. It is also evident that Russia has managed to work on other product categories
thus, showing improvement in shares from 2010-2016 as compared to 2000-2009. 56
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Figure 11: Russia’s share of global exports in selected categories of weapon systems, 2000–09 and 2010–16 (% of
total global arms exports)

Moving on to the past decade, Russia’s weapons sales has also witnessed fluctuations in
terms of rising sales. In 2017 Russia’s weapons sales were $ 5741 million rising to $ 6409 million
in 2018. These fluctuations are represented in figure 13; 2011 observed an all-time high in weapons
sales to $8690 million. 57 I 2017, out of $15 billion of weapons sales, $6.14 billion were of major
weaponry which comprised of military aircraft, ships, armored vehicles and guided munitions. If
these figures are further narrowed down, the monopoly of military aircraft sales in Russian defense
is evident. Out of the $6.14 billion nearly $4 billion were directed towards exports of military
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aircraft. The recipients of these weaponry from Russia in 2017 include Bangladesh, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Angola, Vietnam, Algeria, China, Egypt and India. 58
Out of these top ten countries, this research will focus on India as a case-study falling under
the Russian influence in terms of defense trade. India is an important U.S ally and a defense trading
partner. The second case-study is of Turkey which will also be examined in terms of its recent
unstable relation with the United States and developing military partnership with Russia. Both case
studies will determine how and to what extent Russian penetration in their respective defense
markets is taking place.
Currently, Russian exports for the year of 2019 have reached a total of almost $6 billion
by now. The Russian defense industry is in the phases of examining global trends and adapting to
new areas of work within the market. These include challenges such as economic restriction and
various financial operations for foreign trade. These economic restrictions define and limit the
scope of trade for Russia with other foreign countries that are under obligation to adhere to rules
applied by financial institutions. This in result hampers the Russian arms selling with other players
in the global market. U.S efforts symbolize how economic policies are used in order to compete
with the Russian defense industry, in terms of creating trade barriers that allow the United States
to remain the number one within the global defense industrial complex. A key example of these
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economic restrictions affecting Russian defense industry was Turkey’s successful move to
purchase the S-400. 59

Figure 12: Russian weapons sales 2010-2018
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1. Turkey

Turkey’s defense industry has observed transformation over the last two decades. This
transformation is characterized by military modernization. Based on a stable political leadership
under Erdogan’s support for defense expenditure and various operations. Based on open-source
investigation, Turkey possessed a total defense spending of $12.98 billion in 2018, attaining 18th
rank globally within the NATO alliance.
The strategic plan of Turkey from 2012-2016 was formulated to boost the involvement of
Turkish firms in various defense programs and exports.60 The boost of these exports is reflective
in the following graph extracted from SIPRI’s database on financial value of the global arms trade.
The graph represents Turkey’s financial value of national arms exports from the period of 20092017. As mentioned earlier, the boost of exports from 2012-2016 can be observed, to rise from
$1,200 million to $1,678 million. 61 As compared to the strategic plan for 2012-2016, the strategic
plan for 2017-2021 focused on ‘technological depth and global efficiency’. Whereas, the period
between 2018-2022 has been characterized by ‘technology and sub-systems ownership to facilitate
a sustainable industry’ in order to boost Turkish military and exports.
Another factor that has enabled Turkey to play an important part in global arms race is their
successful combat records during Syria campaigns, e.g. Operation Euphrates Shield allowing
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Turkey to present a broad range of arms like the multiple launch rocket systems, UAVs and
helicopters. This has led to the creation of a warfare environment in Turkey, shaped into a national
pride narrative. 62
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Figure 13: Turkey's Financial Value of National Arms Exports 2009-2017

The military might environment has further advance Turkey’s defense initiatives. Thus, despite
Turkey being a formal NATO ally, it has stepped into heavy defense trade. Ankara’s move to
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purchase the Russia S-400s had been taken highly objectionable by the U.S since the technology
did not only threaten Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter jets but also was a symbolic representation
of a long-term alliance between Russia and Turkey. The alliance was alarming and to some extent
threatening for the U.S national security especially because of Turkey’s geographical location.63
The Turkish defense market will have a great impact in the future due to the S-400
procurement. The SAM (surface-to-air-missile) purchase by Turkey will allow Russia to gain an
important share in global arms exports. Figure 15 shows that since the S-400 deal has been
finalized, JSC Almaz Antey, a major Russian arms company is expected to hold ‘more than 13%
supplier share in the Turkish weapons market’.
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The arm-deal is of key significance since it is

between a NATO and non-NATO member. Considering Turkey borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran
it is questionable to what extent will Moscow exercise its power derived from this defense
partnership? The role of NATO in this aspect is also of key concern. This research in the next
section will further address the dynamics of NATO, its future and implications for U.S military
presence in Europe.
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Figure 14: Turkey weapons supplier share by value

Moreover, the case of Turkey and purchase of S-400 symbolize United States force posture
as a tool that does not yield the results expected. In the case of Turkey too, it was observed how
U.S threat of sanctions had gone quite useless and Turkey managed to pursue its purchase. Not
only has Turkey paved its way to strengthen its ties with Russia, but Kremlin has been able to
utilize its military might to extend its influence. The sale of S-400 allows Russia to dominate and
shape the Turkish foreign policy to a great extent, which will hamper and widen the difference
between U.S and Turkey. Russia’s strong hold in an important NATO country is alarming for the
United States and its bilateral ties with Turkey specifically in the context of Turkey’s support in
Syria, Iran and Venezuela.
Moscow’s strategic foothold in a key NATO country, and complicates U.S. efforts to gain
Turkish cooperation in Syria, Iran, and Venezuela. It is important to question United States policy
69

and further explore its use of force posture, in the case of Turkey U.S could use diplomacy and
negotiations considering that Turkey provided assurance to the U.S about the lack of threats S-400
would have posed to the F-35 program.
The case of Turkey also represents the political economy of national security as explained
in the literature review. The economic-military nexus presents an interlinkage between
international conflict and economic interests. Together the combination shapes the position of the
United States national security and its positioning in the security environment. Conflicts are fueled
by economic interests and trade agreements, which is reflective in the case of U.S, Turkey and
Russia. The politics of economic interests decides the possibility of territorial expansion and
foreign aggression. 65
Turkey as a case-study presents the erosion of the United States global military domination
in respect to how U.S exercised its power in the past, whereas in today’s world order other
competitors exercise equal power which limits the prospect of a single superpower with the
strongest military industrial base. Therefore, even though the United States is the number one
military spender it still is unable to maintain its global military forte in the face of rising
competitors.
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Future of NATO – Military Implications for the United States in Europe

United States and Turkey both are NATO members with very different interests and values.
Initially Turkey was an important ally in terms of curbing communist expansionism. But, in the
light of recent events Turkey has turned down its NATO ally's pressure and has established a
partnership with Russia including the acquisition of air defense system, symbolizing a defense
collaboration between a non-NATO and NATO member.
Turkey's relations with its NATO members has been under scrutiny due to various reasons.
Denying U.S troops access to their territory in the Iraq War followed by the strained relations it
shares with its other NATO member, Greece. The most serious contention and clash with NATO
is Turkey's purchase of S-400 and the growing relationship with Russia. Is Turkey shifting its
foreign policy approach from a Western-based alliance to a more Eastern-based alliance? NATO
is an organization aimed at collective defense in the face of common values and shared threat
perception. But, are Turkey's interests and threats common to those of other NATO members? 66
Turkey-US relations are equally important as is US-NATO relations. The purchase of S400 has been a serious problem between U.S and Turkey which has been further translated into a
'NATO problem'. At the same time, the eroding U.S military dominance accompanied by Trump's
critical approach towards NATO creates a vacuum in the European security affairs. While Trump
highlights the issue of NATO's defense spending and glorifies the 'America First' approach and
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overall generally disregards international organizations it is questionable whether Russia is
provided with an open field to fill in the vacuum?
With the current U.S stance on NATO alliance the future of NATO in terms of U.S military
presence in Europe and how that impacts Russia's positioning is contentious. The shifting security
environment throughout the years has observed U.S and Western Europe's alliance to remain
constant. However, Trump's outlook towards NATO and its policies could alter the partnership
thus, resulting into a free space for opponents to take the lead. While the debate on U.S approach
towards NATO remains relevant, it is significant to analyze whether NATO would survive within
an international order in which the U.S dominance is in decline, and at the same time Trump's
policies restrict added resources to the alliance. Much of this depends on the U.S elections and
whether Trump would be re-elected, and more than that if the U.S policies towards NATO remain
stagnant.
In the case of Trump’s re-election or Trump policies continuation, European security
environment would be greatly impacted. NATO would face multiple security challenges, ranging
from weakened support by the United States to member states increasing partnership with Russia
and weakening of internal cooperation. While these challenges are inevitable European countries
will be pressured to take ownership of their own security thus, the role of NATO would weaken,
allowing Russia to avail the opportunity to expand its sphere of influence. 67
Finally, despite the odds of a disintegration of NATO even if Trump-approach towards
NATO is reformed in future the organization would still face various challenges. In the event of
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these confrontations and the changing international order with rising powers like China and Russia
threatening the United States of America will indeed require an active role in European security.
With the active support by the United States and boosting resources into NATO the tectonic shifts
in the balance of power within Europe could be sustained and restored which would be a win-win
strategy for the stability of U.S and Europe. 68

2. India

India was the fourth biggest military spender in 2018. 60% of the global military spending
included United States, China, Saudi Arabia and France and India. Figure 16 derived from SIPRI’s
military expenditure database exhibits the top 15 countries with the highest share of world military
expenditure in 2018, representing India’s fourth position at 3.7%. This reflects its role within the
global military industrial complex in terms of holding a position next to global and regional
powers. It further increased its military spending by 3.1% since 2011. With a spending worth
$66.5 billion, and an increased military expenditure from 2009-2018 to 29% is contemplative of
India’s role in the global defense industry. 69
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Figure 15: Share of world military expenditure of the 15 countries

Despite the existing political environment between India and Russia, it is important to
examine the past trends between both countries. As compared to India-U.S. defense ties, the year
2014 witnessed stagnation between India and Russia arms trade whereas, the U.S arms exports to
India were soaring high. As taken from SIPRI’s arms transfer database, the figure 17 shows in
trend indicator values (TIV) the drastic fall of Russian arms exports to India and rising U.S arms
exports to India. However, these fluctuations are relative in terms of a broader picture as Russia
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remains a top supplier of arms to India.70 During the period 2010-2014 Russia was observed to
dominate the Indian defense market by 70%. 71
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Figure 16: Russia's Arms Exports to India 2008-2018

Russia’s defense sector has enjoyed a buyer-seller partnership with India through various
joint ventures. The 20th India-Russia annual summit that took place in 2019 marked great
significance for both countries, as they have agreed to prepare a ‘framework for cooperation on
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reciprocal logistics support’. This will thus allow both countries to utilize each other’s naval and
air bases. Furthermore, India would initiate in manufacturing of spare parts for the latter’s military
carried out through transfer of technology and joint ventures. Russia’s extended assistance and
support to Indian defense industry raises various questions for U.S-India partnership in terms of a
force-posture adopted by the United States. With the changing dynamic world order, and India’s
independent foreign policy cannot be underestimated. 72
The defense collaboration between India and Russia is highly valuable to India. The 2014
stagnation between the two countries can be regarded as merely a fluctuation. This slight
fluctuation was in fact followed by the annual summit in 2016 which incorporated the supply of
S-400 missile system, and an added ‘four Admiral Grigrovich-class frigates. 73 These deals were
finalized last year along with the deal for the manufacture of Kamov Ka-226T helicopters. 74 The
Indian army has ordered 135 of Kamov Ka-226T helicopter whereas, the Indian Airforce has
placed an order for 65 of these helicopters too. 75
The S-400 are a great deal within the global security environment. The contract was signed
in October 2018 between Russian President Putin and Indian Prime Minister Modi. The S-400 deal
is worth $5.43 billion which also incorporates the delivery of 5 regiments of the missile system.
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The S-400 possess the capability to operate from surface to bring down enemy aircraft thus, India’s
purchase of S-400 will highly equip the Indian Air Force. However, the S-400 deal is crucial to
U.S-India relationship. The United States can exercise its power of sanctions under the domestic
law using the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act CAATSA, which allows
any country to be imposed with sanctions based on their trade with Russia, North Korea or Iran.76
India’s geographical position is another key factor that plays in its foreign policy decisions.
Sharing borders with China and Pakistan poses a great threat and pressures the need to advance its
military and air force therefore, the purchase of S-400 is a symbolic representation of India’s
defense autonomy within the global defense industry. It will further provide India’s defense with
an added advantage since its air force is already short of squadrons due to aging Russian aircrafts.
It requires 42 squadrons in a possible war with China or Pakistan.
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Considering all the benefits

India will enjoy, the S-400 seems to be a fair deal. But, on the other hand in terms of its politicalsecurity dynamics with the United States a cost-benefit analysis is necessary. What does the future
hold for U.S-India relationships considering, its deal with Russia - a global U.S competitor?
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Figure 17: Trend of US and Russian Imports to India 2013-2018

India’s case-study in this research emphasizes the long-based partnership it has with
Russia, specifically based on its defense trade. Apart from the defense ties, both countries also
share partnership in various multilateral organizations that provide cooperation such as the G20,
RIC, East Asia Summit. Moreover, Russia’s permanent seat at the UN Security Council provides
India with an edge on multiple regional tensions including the Kashmir issue with Pakistan which
is of great political importance to India.
In the changing world order the security dynamics require states to reconsider its
positioning with other countries. In the case of India, it has a strategic decision to make considering
its dependent relationship with China, a growing regional power with an already established
economic-defense partnership with Pakistan. While at the same time, to balance the Chinese
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influence in Asia, Russia would be able to gain a lot by building out closer ties than it already has
with India. The balancing of powers within the region is key, however, in the entire bridging of
partnerships within the region, the United States is the least considered by India. Despite India
enjoying great economic-defense ties with the United States it is evident that India would highly
benefit from reforming its policy to a more open approach to Russia in the Indo-Pacific context.
But the policy formulation and implementation would inevitably face backlash from the United
States. It is also important to note that Russia has explicitly elaborated its policy to be multi-vector
rather than establishing an alliance with China. 78
However, in the context of this security-dilemma there are aspects of key importance to
global stability. How can the United States curb the strengthening of Russian-Indian partnership?
What is the possibility of a Sino-Russian world order? The recent Shanghai Cooperation
Organization led to various debates regarding this possible world order. While multiple sources
support the impossibility of such an order considering both states past ties exhibit their clashing
interests, others point out the power of common threat perception and mutual economic and
political gains that a Sino-Russian world order would yield. 79 Individually neither of the countries
can pose a great threat to the western world as the latter is successful in strategizing the
containment of Chinese and Russian power. The case of a Sino-Russian world order is the only
possibility for a creation of a block that would be able to challenge and further, heavily compete
with the western world. Thus, either both states can adopt a competing approach in Central Asia
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or an approach of cooperation to alter the existing international order, which means a collision
with American unilateralism. Strengthening partnership between two Cold-War rivals would be a
win-win situation for India within the region and globally.
The security dilemma in terms of what the future holds for India, China, Russia, United
States highly depends on the growing strategic partnerships with these growing powers. India has
always been a U.S defense partner however, Pakistan being a U.S ally and more recently its
intensified economic-military partnership with China poses a great threat to India thus, India’s
move to extend deepened ties with either China or Russia is foreseeable within the region. On the
other hand, current U.S-Indian alignment gap has been observed therefore, the process of nonalignment between U.S and India can be predicted. Last but not the least, India’s non-alignment
policy is a historical key feature of its system that till date is relevant in order to maintain Indian
sovereignty and oppose imperialism. Its non-alignment policy is also reflected in its defense trade
with Russia despite United States congress declaring India as a ‘Major Defense Partner’ in 2016.
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Chapter 5: Analysis
I.

Implication of China’s military expansion
China’s case-study provides data on heavy economic investment however, the case of

Djibouti and Iran within China’s case-study covers China’s military interests. Furthermore, the
expanded economic investment in various countries allows China to grow its role as a major arms
dealer. The culture of economic investment and dependency created by China is translating into
strategic-defense partnership with the recipient countries.
According to SIPRI, China has a massive defense budget which is estimated to be $250
billion in 2018. China’s Ministry of National Defense concluded in 2018 that its budget rose to
8.1% year over year. However, it is key to note, SIPRI and Pentagon’s findings are similar that
China’s estimates lack several expenditures and procurement projects therefore, the existing
growth is inaccurate.
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There is a possibility, the limited nature of China’s defense projects and

release of information is contributing to a greater competition for the United States. Absence of
transparency and release of defense projects information is a possibility of further economicmilitary expansionist agenda.
While China is competing with top arms dealer such as United States and Russia it is
important to observe the recipients of China's sales. Many of these customers are also China's Belt
Road Initiative partners therefore, allowing China to have an easy access in posing itself as an
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alternative to Russia and the United States of America as a defense trading partner. The BRI
partners are not only a potential market for Chinese arms exports, but they are also an open field
for China to exercise its military power. An example of this is Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh
that have received China's top arms exports since 2007. All three countries are China's BRI
participant countries and thus, the role of China's global development strategy and its sales within
the global defense market are interconnected.
Furthermore, it is significant to identify what the BRI partners offer to China in terms of
maximizing their arms sales in these countries. Firstly, selling arms to BRI partners is cost efficient
for China. Secondly, it allows China to improve security environment in these countries by
dubbing it as 'securing Chinese investments through the utilization of PLA. Iran is an example of
how China is deploying its forces in the name of protecting economic investments. Thus, with low
cost and minimized spending the active involvement of PLA in these BRI countries is possible
further allowing an economic dependency by recipient countries pushing for acquisition of
Chinese arms. 82
Considering these shifts, it is questionable, to what extent is the Belt Road Initiative using
its economic power to expand its global military presence? Is the future of BRI a threat to the
United States in terms of military expansionism? Various debates have circled around about the
Belt Road Initiative having military ambitions. In the case of Pakistan, it was observed to take a
military turn in terms of investing $ 62 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
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narrowing the development to a Chinese-built seaport in Gwadar symbolizing the future use of
this sea route that connects to Arabia sea. The Gwadar port would yield potential militarized
benefits in the light of establishing maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region. 83
Gwadar port's strategic location in terms of being only 107 miles from Chabahar port in
Iran has multiple implications too. While China develops the Gwadar port, India advances in
laying the foundations of Chabahar, calling out for a 'New Great Game in South Asia' with regional
powers aggressively moving towards the establishment of strong maritime presence within the
region. Chinese economic investments in this cannot be analyzed in isolation. As compared to the
case of Iran, China is highly interested in the security of its workers and resources in CPEC projects
thus, pushing for PLA presence to provide safety. Despite this, Pakistan initiating a Special
Security Division comprising of 15,000 personnel for the purpose of protection, the GilgitBaltistan dam construction case reflects that eventually the People’s Liberation Army soldiers are
deployed to ensure security. 84
This research analyzes the pattern of Chinese economic investments to be tied with the
deployment of PLA in the name of ensuring security whereas, the military presence within Iran,
Pakistan and Djibouti can have long-term strategic implications. The security environment in
South Asia will be governed by Chinese influence if prolonged military presence is observed.
Furthermore, Chinese expansionism is not only limited to South Asia, in addition to the growing
major arms deal it is boosting its military expenditure too. China's defense budget in 2018
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estimated to nearly $250 billion according to SIPRI; securing a second position right after the
United Sates. Despite China's defense budget growth slowing, the country does not plan to reduce
its defense budget. The Ministry of National defense pointed out the expected budget for military
spending to rise by 7.5% to $117.6 billion; this would make '2019 the fourth consecutive year of
single-digit budget growth'. As compared to the United States military expenditure which has
witnessed fluctuations, China's military expenditure has been on a consecutive rise since 1998.
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(see figure 18) Based on the findings within the case-study, China’s military expansionism behind
the curtain of global development projects is a major threat to U.S global influence.

Figure 18: Military Expenditure (USA-China; 1989-2018)
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II.

Implication of Russia’s Military Expansion
To what extent can Russia compete with the United States in the global defense market?

Despite Russia holding the second position as the largest arms exporter, the gap between the United
States and Russia’s arms exports is quite wide. U.S exports were 36% of the global total between
2014-2018. On the other hand, as shown in figure 19 Russian arms exports decreased by 17%
between the same period.
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Thus, Russia’s second position after the United States as an arms

exporter is relative since its growth rate increase or decrease reflects the extent it can compete with
the U.S. Nonetheless, it is crucial to observe whether this decrease is a short-term fluctuation or a
long-term pattern of decrease.

Figure 19: Changes in volume of major arms exports since 2009-2013 by the 10 largest exporters in 2014-2018

“Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018,” SIPRI, March 2019,
https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2018
86

85

Facts exhibit that the decrease in arms exports were significantly impacted by diminishing
Indian and Venezuelan arms imports, both being main customers of Russian imports. Russian
imports by India dropped by 42% between the 2014-2018 period whereas, Venezuelan arms
exports dropped by 96% in the same period. While this period records a fluctuation in arms exports
between Russia and its main customers, other countries are observed to take place to some extent.
55% of Russian arms exports were received by India, China and Algeria. China and Algeria both
are not Russia’s main customers therefore, a reduction in Indian imports was compensated through
selling to other countries though, the growth was still seen in negative.
Regionally, Russia also expanded its customer base by selling 60% of its arms exports to
states in Asia and Oceania. The period between 2009-2013 and 2014-2018 recorded an increase
of 19% in Russian arms exports to the Middle East. Within the Middle East, Iraq and Egypt were
the main recipients account falling for 46 and 36 percent of arms exports by Russia.
Currently, Russian market share in Turkey’s defense industry has also taken strength since
2018, therefore considering the Russian case-study it is evident that despite the role of U.S
sanctions hampering Russia’s arms sales to other countries, its decrease in arms exports for a
specific period is just a short-term fluctuation. Russia is exploring to trade its arms with other
countries other than India and Venezuela. Some of these countries were previously important U.S
allies such as Turkey, a NATO member. Therefore, the future trajectory of Russian arms sales can
be regarded as diversified and expanding into various other regions. With a new diversified
approach, cost-effective arms with lesser conditions attached by Russia is in all spheres competing
with the United States of America. It is also further posing great challenges to the global military
advantage of the United States in Europe, and by adjusting its defense trade with global trends and
further exploring into newer markets.
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What the Russian arms offer that the U.S arms do not?
Russia is a key competitor of the United States in terms of arms trade within the global
armament industry. The reasons why Russian arms seem a good option for countries is because
they either do not enjoy a healthy political relation with the West, and thus deem Russia as an
alternative, or lack the adequate amount of budget for attaining modernized military equipment.
Based on two of these broadly categorized reasons the Russian arms offer a lot more that interplays
with their positioning as second largest arms exporter.
Some key elements that allow Russia’s arms to be attractive for many countries are first,
in the late Soviet phase a well-established military-technological base had been developed which
allowed the basis for Russian weapons exports. Some of these include Su-30MK family of fighter
jets, T-90 main battle tanks, and the S-300 SAM systems line. Second, Russian arms compared to
American arms are less expensive, provide easy operation and meet the needs of the technological
demands of developing nations.87 Within the U.S defense industry Lockheed Martin makes the
THAAD, (Terminal High Altitude Area defense; an American anti-ballistic missile defense
system) and its battery rings cost about $3 billion. Raytheon, another major U.S company makes
the Patriot system (surface-to-air missile system) and its battery costs $1 billion. If these are
compared to the Russian S-400 (long-range surface-to-air missile system) that cost roughly $500
million, it is evident that the cost variation gives Russia a lead over American arms. Recently, after
Turkey has purchased the S-400, various countries have shown interest in purchasing the Russian
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S-400, reflecting the potential competition rise for U.S.
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Third, unlike U.S arms and the string

attached with them, the Russian offer arms without conditionalities, therefore allowing easy
transfer of technology without political and economic constraints. Fourth, the Russian arms are an
easy export with an added benefit of provision of broad category of different arms which include
some technologically and militarily ‘game-changer’ ones, such as the SS-26 Iskandar short-range
ballistic missiles, and the S-400 SAM systems. Lastly, the Russian defense markets is better
equipped at offering advanced after-sales service for the equipment sold along upgrades. 89
In my view, out of the five reasons that boost Russian arms exports provided above, the
most important and crucial ones in the global defense competition between the two countries is
the cost-conditionalities nexus. In what I term as the cost-conditionalities nexus, the cost being
inexpensive Russian arms intertwined with reduced economic and political constraints allows
countries to prioritized Russian arms over U.S arms.
The economic-military nexus as mentioned earlier in the literature-review section, is of
great significance within the global military advantage. The economic forces have a profound
impact on countries and their defense policy decisions in terms of how they select their trading
partners and gives way for countries to explore a more diversified approach. This approach further
also focuses on, avoiding to place all strategic eggs in the American basket. The economic-military
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nexus has a direct relation with U.S force posture in terms of the economic limitations that come
along with their exports. If these cost-conditionalities constraints stop acting as a trade barrier for
countries to export U.S arms, the defense competition environment would look quite different.
The case-study on Turkey and India within this research address the direct and indirect
relationship with the cost-conditionalities nexus. In the case of Turkey, this thesis examines to
what extent has the role of cost and conditionalities impacted the U.S-Turkey relations. It has
further investigated, whether there are other factors involved in the recent developing military ties
between Russia and Turkey. The case of India has been analyzed to assess the positioning of its
arms exports with Russia and America as global competitors while it holds a U.S-ally tag.

Chapter 6: Causes of The Erosion of U.S Military Advantage
The United States diminishing global military advantage, presence and influence is
intertwined with multiple factors. These factors can be divided into two sets, the internal factors
and external factors. The internal factors vary from reduced competition, mergers and
consolidation and prioritized corporate interests over national security interests. Whereas the
external factors range from U.S force posture hampering its military dominance, Sino-Russian
competition, and smaller states broadening their defense trading programs leading to shifts in
global defense trade and formation of new regional alliances.
This section explores two most important factors, once each from internal and external
category. Firstly, the United States force posture in terms of sanctions and too many strings
attached with military sales. Secondly, internal competition within the United States defense
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industry. Each factor is analyzed to further explain its impact on the loss in global military forte.
The internal competition further identifies other factors contributing to the erosion of global
military edge whereas, the force posture factor is explored in the context of how the United States
loses its defense trading partners to its competitors like Russia and China.

a. Force posture; the problem of sanctions and too many strings attached with military
sales
The purpose of this section in the research is to address the ineffectiveness of sanctions in
reference to defense trade. The frequent and over use of sanctions is becoming problematic in
today's multipolar world. How impactful are United States sanctions in bringing about political
outcomes?
The use of sanctions as derived from the United States force posture has multiple political
implications for the country in the context of how it exercises its military advantage. These
sanctions vary in nature, whether they’re on a single individual like the Mexican drug lord ‘El
Chapo’ or entire governments like Iran. The role, extent and nature of these sanctions is an
important aspect of whether they yield short and long-term benefits or in fact hamper its
international standing. This research has explored the case-study of Turkey in terms of the United
States threats of sanctions in the purchase of S-400 from Russia lacking the ability to act as a
cudgel sharper.
The U.S practice of using sanctions has led to some success like the negotiations between
North Korea and U.S over the nuclear program. But, at the same time sanctions have faced
resentment from various allies from Europe, as it acts as a threatening force to their own economic
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interests for example, restrictions on trading with Iran or Russia. Such sanctions lead to strained
relations with countries, but more so the question of what is the risk of sanction for the long-term
stability of the United States in the global world order is relevant? Has the use of sanctions to
impact the achievement of specific policy goals failed? 90
In the recent light of events, Turkey was followed by India to consider buying the S-400
from Russia. Various public articles and reports highlight the possibility of U.S sanctions placed
if India decides to carry out the acquisition. Despite India’s move to consider purchase of S-400
raising questions regarding its future military and defense trajectory, it is more important to
identify that the aggressive force posture of the United States is undermining its long-term
economic, defense and foreign policy strength rather than resulting in favorable results. 91
The U.S force posture which is reflected in its aggressive stance in matters of defense in
the form of excessive sanctions is damaging its political and diplomatic reputation thereby,
creating an open field for countries to adhere to their national security interests and pursue defense
partnerships with U.S competitors. The weakening impact of the sanctions further translates into
diminishing diplomatic and political pressure in the field of defense equipment acquisitions,
resulting in the added erosion of United States global military influence.
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b. Internal competition in United States Defense Industry
The United States defense industry has a domination over the share of global arms sales. U.S
is the largest defense spender, holding a budget of over $586.7 billion in 2017. It is further expected
to sustain its superiority within the global defense market. The defense expenditure is forecasted
to increase at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of more than 5.7% reaching to $798 billion
by 2022. 92 The U.S defense monopoly is provided by the top defense companies based in the US.
These firms are the top producers of major global weapons ranging from hypersonic missiles to
fighter jets and combat ships. In 2017 top 100 companies made weapons sales worth $398.2 billion
which was a third-year continuous growth of the industry.
However, it is important to note the U.S companies and defense industry is not monolithic
thus, faces global competition. The world’s top 10 defense firms that account fall for the growth
in 2017 included, one Russian company; Almaz-Antey that made $8.6 billion worth of arms sales
(see figure 20) followed by, one British company; BAE systems making $22.9 billion of arms
sales. Three European companies combined for $29.2 billion of arms sales which included
Leonardo, Thales and Airbus Group. The remaining five are U.S based companies; General
Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. These companies
comprised a total of $137.6 billion of arms sales whereas, the Russian, British and European
comprise arms sales of $60.7 billion. 93 Figure 22 shows that out of these top ten companies, 30%
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share is of non-U. S companies, thus reflecting the contribution to arms sales which further
translates into United States defense industry being heavily competed with. One of the competitors
is Almaz-Antey, a Russian arms production company. Therefore, the Russian penetration in the
global arms market gives rise to higher competition for the U.S market.
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To compare the top five U.S based companies, Lockheed Martin made maximum sales,
worth $44.9 billion thus, reflecting domination within the U.S defense industry. It has the first
position within U.S defense industry comprising of 32.6% of total sales whereas, Boeing holds the
second position with a 19.5% share. However, the gap between both companies has increased from
11% billion in 2016 to $18 billion in 2017, thus, reflecting Lockheed Martin's continuous growth
and monopoly within the U.S defense market. Other companies together have a share of 47.6%;
Raytheon 17.3%, Northrop Grumman 16.2% and General Dynamics 14.1%. With the above
figures it is also fair to conclude that Lockheed Martin holds the position of being the world’s
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largest arms producer with arms sales of $44.9 billion in 2017 alone. 94 But that does not translate
into absolute monopoly since within the U.S defense industry it faces challenges from other
companies whereas, globally it has major competitors too.
This paper traces back the section on risk factors impacting the U.S industrial base that
expanded the dynamics of competition with competitors, respectively with China however, the
research now elaborates the impact of internal competition within the U.S defense industry. What
does Lockheed Martin’s monopoly say about the United States internal competition? Is the United
States defense industry monolithic?
The report on Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base
and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States outlines various factors of the decline of the U.S
defense industry in terms of its manufacturing capabilities and capacity. Some of these factors
include loss in manufacturing workforce, offshoring of manufacturing and reduced technical
innovation. But one of the main factors that is quite significant in shaping the erosion of military
advantage is the pattern of diminishing competition internally within the defense industry.
Whereas, globally the erosion is characterized by the rise of competition due to other competitors
infiltrating the market. The opposite shifts in internal-external competition for the U.S defense
industry will eventually lead to intensified military erosion and contribute to the United States
defense industry being impacted in terms of weapons sales and share, as well as in power
exercising. 95

“Global Arms Industry: US Companies Dominate the Top 100; Russian Arms Industry Moves to Second
Place,” SIPRI, December 10, 2018, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-arms-industry-uscompanies-dominate-top-100-russian-arms-industry-moves-second-place)
94

“Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain,”
Department of Defense (Inter-agency Task Force, n.d.), accessed November 4, 2019)
95

95

The internal competition within the U.S defense industry is based on various reasons,
ranging from company mergers to decline in the manufacturing base. A specific example of this
is the shipbuilding sector which carries out naval equipment construction and maintenance. The
equipment includes, aircrafts, submarines, weapons and command control systems. 6 out of 10
industries within the naval shipbuilding sector were in the manufacturing sector, but these
industries faced a drop-down in 2000 of over 20,500 U.S establishments due to the global shift in
industrial base. Till the 2000s China held a share of 15% in global machine tool consumption, but
by 2011 its share increased to 40% of the global total. Such external shifts and challenges absorbed
by the U.S defense industry limit the capacity of the industry's production and long-term growth,
hampering not only the U.S economy but also weakening its global position in terms of its military
edge. 96
Furthermore, within the internal competition the problem of monopoly, company mergers
and controlled government contracts heighten the erosion of global military supremacy. The
history of Lockheed’s merger with Martin in 1995, and later in 2015 the $9 billion acquisition of
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation reflects the monopolization of the industry internally thus, facing
greater challenges in the global market. Mergers and consolidation amplify the reduction in
competition, innovation and military advancement.97 Between 1993 and 2000, the number of prime
contractors dropped down from 50 to 6 that took advantage of team bids to government contracts,
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threatening competition and military edge negatively.
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With such great size and concentration,

power is misused, and corporate advantage is placed above national security interest.
While the United States government heavily relies on single sourced contract route thus,
raising the question of clash between corporate and national security interests. It is observed that
the government is hostage to one company, Lockheed Martin thus, undermining its democratic
values. Lockheed Martin’s 2018 annual report mentions that 70% of their net sales were derived
from government contracts, whereas 60% were from the department of defense (DoD). The
company further expected to boost its sales from government contracts which are provided based
on the continued ‘Congressional appropriations’. 99
Together all these factors represent how diminishing competition and diversification can
further raise costs and hamper innovation, thus ending into amplified erosion of global military
might. Another recent news observed in the defense industry is about the merging of Raytheon
and United Technologies Corporation’s defense division. This will further threaten the decreased
military might of the country.
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In order to maintain the existing global military power, it is

important for the country to control concentration, mergers, eroding innovation and reduced
competition. Sustenance of the United States military-industrial complex is subject to firstly,
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prioritizing national security concerns above corporate interests and secondly promote a diverse
and dynamic defense industrial base with heightened competition in the context of winning
government contracts.

Chapter 7: Is There A Way Back?
There are various interconnected conditions that apply to the case of whether the United States
can lead its way back to the return of its global military supremacy. There are multiple reasons that
may or may not favor the U.S to establish a dominating global military power in the international
order. The findings of this thesis determine the challenges for U.S global military edge. These
challenges include the following set of internal and external factors:

Internal Factors

1. The United States defense strategy

The United States defense strategic concept is under scrutiny considering its force posture
and the implications it has for the changing new world order. Its force posture as mentioned in its
Defense Strategy of 2018 in fact limits the goal of ‘preserving peace through strength’ and
curbing the ‘eroding cohesion among allies and partners, and reduced access to markets’

‘A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust
constellation of allies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable
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balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order. Collectively, our force
posture, alliance and partnership architecture, and Department modernization will provide the
capabilities and agility required to prevail in conflict and preserve peace through strength.’ 101

America’s force posture has helped throughout the years for difficult negotiations; ranging
from its war on terrorism to restricting countries from nuclear proliferation and shaping alliances
on its own terms. But, the existing fluctuations within the security environment whereby, the U.S
identifies global competitors like China and Russia; regional competitors like Iran and North
Korea, and finally terrorist networks as a major threat poses different kind of risks to the American
national security. Today the United States faces a set of challenges, very different from the past;
countering shifts in Indo-Pacific, Europe and threats faced by terror networks.
Considering the changing nature of international landscape, the use of force posture and hard
policy in terms of sanctions, lethal force, preserving peace by strength will neither ‘strengthen
alliances’ nor ‘attract new partners.’ Iran’s current status of resuming uranium enrichment,
Turkey’s acquisition of S-400 and India’s potential to acquire the S-400 despite threat of U.S
sanctions are examples that reflect the U.S policies based on force posture towards international
order does not have the same output as it did in the past. If anything, the current strategy will yield
more damaging results in the form of disintegration of alliances and erosion of military
partnerships.
The United States defense strategy’s scope, objectives, outlined policies and approach will
play an important part in whether the United States can pave its way back in terms of the eroding

“Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” U.S Department of Defense, n.d.,
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global military edge. A shift in force posture into a more cooperative strategy defined by
partnership, competition and strengthening alliances through diplomacy and negotiations would
be favorable in sustaining the United States military might and influence within the global security
order.

2. United States defense industry’s declining manufacturing base

U.S declining defense base is triggered by monopoly, company mergers and controlled
government contracts. As explained earlier in the research, the internal competition in the United
States defense industry is subject to extreme centralization and mergers; Lockheed Martin alone
has 32.6% of arms sales, holding first position in the industry whereas, Boeing holds the second
position with 19.5% worth of arms sales. 102 This reflects how more than 50% share of U.S defense
industry is in control of two companies. As identified by the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial
Base report one of the main causes of a declining industrial base is the loss of capabilities and
capacities thus, impacting a healthy competition within the industry.
Furthermore, centralization has further aggravated declining prime contractors which dropped
from 50 to 6 therefore, exhibiting a tight control on government contracts. Limited contractors
provided to the government prioritize corporate interests over national security interests as
observed in Lockheed Martin’s pattern of deriving 70% of its net sales from government contracts
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in 2018. 103 However, the monopolization within the industry does not by any means represent the
monolithic nature of the U.S defense industry, as internal loss of competition is the triggering
factor for other competitor nations challenging U.S industrial base.
The declining innovation and manufacturing base within the U.S defense industry can
eventually lead to higher competition posed by China and Russia, translating into the further
erosion of U.S military control. On the other hand, addressing the issue of centralization, controlled
government contracts and monopoly can allow the U.S to counter the process of erosion and
declining influence.

External Factors

3. Increased market share of the United States competitors

The United States defense industry faces extreme competition by regional opponents mainly,
China and Russia. China's conventional arms sales rose to $645 million to $1.04 billion from 2008
to 2018. 75% of these exports went to Asia while 20% went to Africa. Mostly Chinese arms exports
recipients are neighboring countries however, it still accounts fall for an increased market share
aggressively competing with the United States. 104
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Considering Russia's defense industry, recent shifts have been observed in terms of
significant growth of Russian defense companies. For the first time, Almaz-Antey; Russia's largest
arms producing company was ranked with U.S companies in top ten for global arms sales.
Moreover, Almaz-Antey increased its arms sales to 17% to $ 8.6 billion in 2016. The significant
growth and infiltration in global arms industry symbolize Russia's military modernization. Other
growth trends within the Russian defense market are seen with the three Russian firms increasing
their arms sales more than 15%. United Engine by 25%, High Precision Systems by 33% and
Tactical Missiles by 19%. Russian companies boosted their arms sales more than 8 % in 2017. 105
For the United States to respond to high rise of global defense competition it would require
boosting innovation and strengthening its defense partnerships. Moreover, it would need to
overtake the benefits that Russian and Chinese arms offer. The cost-conditionalities factor
whereby, Russia and China exercise greater leverage with defense trading partners in the context
of reduced costs and lesser conditions attached to arms sales is a crucial implication for global
competition and defense market share.

Michael Peck, “Russia: Now Number 2 in Military Sales (Any Guess Who Is Number 1?),” The Center for
the National Interest
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4. An increased global disorder i.e. growing powers such as China and Russia in terms
of their expansionist agenda both economically and militarily

a. China’s economic advancement, its Belt and Road Initiative and military
modernization in Asia, Africa and the Middle East

This thesis expands into China as a case-study to address its economic advancement
coupled with its military development. The findings within this research include mainly the Belt
Road Initiative – as an undercover military expansionist project. The first step towards military
expansion is control of economic tools, which China is seen to be advancing towards. Along
economic control that China exercises it is militarily advancing through these investments in BRI
member countries.
The economic-military nexus plays a key role in the case of China overtaking the United
States as the number one military spender, allowing the latter to lose its military edge. China’s
economic investments in Iran, Pakistan and Djibouti as well as various other BRI members is
paired with military partnership. In the case of Iran, deploying security personnel in the name of
protection of economic investments, in Pakistan establishing the Gwadar port in a tightly-secured
environment posing militarized benefits in terms of maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region,
and lastly Djibouti where China has a naval base symbolizing a defense policy shift.
The collaborated economic-military efforts define the return of China as a global power in
the great power politics. This contributes heavily to the United States eroding global military
presence. The military capabilities China possesses are becoming threatening to U.S military
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influence as compared to the past. China’s policy in developing newer tools to counter U.S remain
prevalent in terms of military modernization and economic development. As compared to Russia,
China poses a great threat and risk to the American national security therefore, a policy to deter
Chinese expansion is a dire need of the present.

b. Russia seeking global hegemony

The return of a global Russia entailing rebuilding of strategic partnerships, expanding
military base, boosting arms sales with NATO members challenges U.S power across the globe. It
is important to determine whether Russia is one of the main players in the international order or
can it replace the United States as a superpower? Considering Russia’s military approach towards
U.S allies; mainly Turkey and India the findings of this research identify Russia as a defense
competitor however, in relative terms the military power it is expanding is not to a great extent.
Almaz Antey has intruded into the global arms sales however, the global share is still small; only
at 4% therefore, the U.S faces an immediate threat by China in the process of its global military
erosion rather than Russia. Russia can be regarded as a regional power since much of its customer
base in terms of arms sales is centered in Asia and Oceania. It has been observed to increase its
exports in Middle East however, if that narrowed down to mostly to Iraq and Egypt thus the extent
to which Russia would exercise its influence is contested.
However, current U.S-NATO relations are in direction conflict with Russia’s positioning. U.S
policies towards NATO initiate a vacuum creation for Russia to impact U.S influence in Western
Europe. Increasing partnership with NATO members would allow the former to weaken U.S
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influence thus, impacting European security. Russia can potentially utilize Turkey to weaken U.S
influence however, at the same time face backlash from other NATO members.
Lastly, despite the United States identifying Russia as a possible threat it is important to
consider that a country’s influence is not limited to its military might, and in the case of Russia,
its economic size, productivity, technology and management skills as well as diplomatic strength
do not match United States pace. The developments in the arena of science, culture and education
are all important factors which Russia still lags far behind.

5. Re-emergence of strategic partnerships and shifting of alliances impacting regional
and global stability

Aggressive regional challengers - North Korea, Turkey and Iran are broadening their military
partnership with the United States global competitors, mainly Russia and China. The reemergence
of these powers is leading to a shift in the existing alliances whereby, these states are establishing
regional blocs to threaten American interests and global influence. Mutual interests include
competitor states expanding their military capabilities to replace the U.S as a global power, and
regional powers benefiting from diversifying their defense interests; both striving towards exerting
greater pressure on U.S. While China and Russia exercise power on U.S alliances, smaller states
find this as an opportunity to skillfully rise out of American influence.
The change in geopolitical ambitions is a collaborated economic-military effort by global and
regional powers. The threat the United States faces from Iran will be amplified in the case of a
China backed Iran. The same case applies to North Korea, in the eventuality of Russia
strengthening ties with the former. The reemergence of strategic partnership and new alliances
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together with threats from terrorist networks and a declining global U.S military influence will
weaken U.S hegemonic status. The rules of international order will be governed by multiple
competing actors.

Finally, while these above-mentioned factors interplay in determining whether there is a way
back for the United States to restore its eroding global military power, it is also important to
identify the measurement of erosion. Therefore, the argument this thesis represents is that the
erosion of military edge is not in monetary terms. Thus, the United States can have the highest
military expenditure and can still be the number one arms exporter, but despite that it is facing an
erosion of its military advantage. This erosion is calculated in terms of the United States ability to
perform single-handedly in dictating the rules of international order, its loss of partnerships and
alliance, its inability to curb competitors from infiltrating the defense industry and finally
unsuccessful in countering the competition and threat it faces from revisionist powers.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion

This thesis is about the United States eroding global military supremacy, and whether it
can pave its way back to exercising absolute power and influence within the international order.
To address the question, the research considers Russia and China as a case-study analyzing the
impact of their military implications and expansionist tendencies on the balance of military edge
that the U.S exercises globally. It narrows down these case-studies in examining the influence they
yield within the Middle East, Asia and Africa thus, causing challenges for the U.S in these
respective regions.
The research identifies various causes for the erosion which entail firstly, the weakening
U.S defense industrial base, whereby reduced competition and monopolization leads to controlled
government contracts - reflecting the prioritization of corporate interests over national security
interests. The American defense industry is currently controlled by two leading firms, Lockheed
Martin which holds 32.6% of arms sales, and Boeing with 19.5% worth of arms sales. Lockheed
Martin specifically derives most of its sales and profits from government contracts, therefore, the
politicization of the corporate sector is an obstacle in the way of achieving national interests. The
monopoly of two major companies within the defense industry acts as a barrier to healthy
competition, innovation and economies of scale. Secondly, the United States defense strategy is
inefficient in meeting the demands of a new security environment. It lacks the ability to formulate
policies that match the changing nature of global security and shifting of alliance. The defense
strategy still implies the traditional power structure which is incompatible with the new emerging
threats. Direct utilization of forceful tactics for defense is a major driver for the U.S diminishing
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global power. The absence of economic initiatives, cooperation and forming partnerships based on
mutual interests is a key in determining the erosion of U.S domination. Thirdly, the research
highlights U.S force posture as a cause for the reduced domination. The politics of sanctions and
hard line policies fails to attract new partners rather, causing a break-down of existing strategic
partnerships. The case of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian S-400 is analyzed to determine the
impact of sanctions on nations.
Lastly, increased inter-state competition in the form of reemergence of China and Russia
as revisionist powers is yet another cause for the declining U.S military might. Both case-studies
observed a pattern of utilization of soft power in the form of economic resources, diplomacy and
negotiations to attain national security interests. Russia and China’s defense strategy vary from the
U.S defense strategy to a great extent. While the latter prioritizes use of force posture, sanctions,
lethal force and sanctions, the revisionist powers extend their influence through attracting new
economic-defense partners. China has successfully developed partnerships with various countries
in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe through its global development project, the Belt Road
Initiative (BRI). Using the economic gains, it is further expanding its military might and presence
within member countries. The Belt Road Initiative characterized by debt-trap diplomacy reflects
to be an undercover military project whereby, China infiltrates into countries while providing
cheap loans with lesser strings attached. On the other hand, Russia is also extending out defense
partnerships in the form of arms sales at lesser price with lesser strings attached compared to the
United States. As both countries continue to pursue their expansionist strategies, the United States
would face multiple challenges externally and internally.
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Therefore, while these tectonic shifts are observed in the global geopolitical landscape, the
United States would need to adopt a range of strategies to overcome its eroding global military
dominance and sustain the existing advantage it has. The answer to the research question is
dependent on the policies that the United States will pursue which then determine whether it can
pave its way back or face increased erosion.
While competitor states use military, economic, political and diplomatic tools to challenge the
United States global military influence, this research suggests a policy shift that can curb
competition. The strategies the United States can endorse to restore and protect its global military
power, mainly focus around laying out operational concepts that enable U.S to constraint China,
Russia and other key states from expanding their sphere of influence. These strategic concepts
include firstly, U.S translating its force posture into exercising soft power in the form of
negotiations, large-scale global development projects and creating a culture of dependency in order
to attain its defense objectives under the cover of soft power. United States defense approach relies
heavily on deterring regional threats through exercising its power. As compared to China and
Russia, that are using economic development and defense partnerships to extend this influence.
The latter do not dictate their terms while negotiating economic-military agreements, whereas, the
United States economic aid and defense trade comes along with impacting conditions. Recent
International Monetary Fund (IMF) aid to Pakistan demanded increased scrutiny for debt payable
to China, and various other conditions attached. Such dimensions compel recipient countries to reconsider future partnerships.
Secondly, addressing the inefficiency of U.S defense industry by boosting innovation and
promoting competition will assist in overcoming the process of erosion. However, there remains a
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clash between policy makers and the interests of U.S defense industry since corporate gains are
given an edge over national security concerns. The problem of monopolization within the defense
industry that holds a dominant position in acquiring government contracts limits the possibility of
growth. A conflict of interest within the defense industry and government machinery is observed
which arises from placing corporate leadership in government roles. A key example of this is the
case of Patrick Michael Shanahan who served as a senior vice president for Boeing and was also
a member of the Boeing Executive Council before holding the position as an Acting U.S Secretary
Defense in 2019. Thus, policy makers give preference to boosting company growth rather than
industrial innovation.
Thirdly, promoting U.S arms sales across different regions rather than concentrating sales to a
specific region contributes to the diminishing global military power. Currently, Saudi Arabia is
the largest U.S arms importer, thus the U.S would need to diversify its defense market and
customer base in order to regain its military power. In order to increase and diversify its arms sales,
the U.S would need to reflect on the cost-conditionalities factor as revealed in this thesis which
allows Russia and China to absorb U.S market share. Most nations today in an altering security
setting prefer to purchase arms with less strings attached which the United States does not offer. It
would be vital to consider whether the United State can sell arms at a reduced price and with lesser
conditions?
The premise in this study states that the United States can pave its way back in reinstating
its global military strength dependent on the factors provided. Nevertheless, there is still a broader
debate about firstly, can the United States still fail to defend its global influence despite bringing
a policy change? Therefore, the impact of United States strategic concept has far-reaching effects.
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It can shift from a force posture which discourages global hegemony and deters regional threats in
protecting its own interest to a new strategy characterized by encouraging cooperative international
community through establishing alliances and using soft power. Nevertheless, it can still fail to
acquire its previous dominant position. Secondly, another opposing view in the broader discussion
is that military might, and sales of weapons comes with a burden for the United States policymakers. These concerns are in the context of potential for misuse and violation of human rights by
the general public. Furthermore, the discourse on whether maximizing military power positively
influences American security or not is also relevant and controversial. Arms sales providing
security to the American interests is arguable to quite an extent since it’s already existing
geography, a secure nuclear arsenal and promising economic conditions pose less threat to the
national security of the U.S.
On the contrary, in terms of declining influence the role of military might is to a great
extent positive. Military edge and sales of arms provide an extended sphere of power on nations.
Therefore, after providing a case for U.S paving its way back and a case against U.S military
supremacy, the findings of this research concludes and suggests that in order to refrain from
unstable security environment the United States should reconsider its strategic outlook.
Encouraging a policy shift by promoting global development initiatives coupled with favorable
arms sales, strengthening regional alliances, boosting innovation and diversity in its defense
industry, addressing controlled government contracts, limiting conflicts of interests and building a
culture of dependency can reestablish its global military domination.
Despite the United States defense strategy accepting newer challenges and a dire need for
countering these confrontations, it still lacks a shift of policy in attending to the changing world
order. The declining of U.S military edge in various regions is majorly caused by Chinese and
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Russian efforts in framing out counter defense strategies and newer models to weaken the U.S
power. The United States observes the altering patterns in revisionist powers defense strategies
and lays an emphasis on deterring their rapid expansion, but even then, fails to initiate a newer
policy. Even today the focus of the strategy symbolizes building lethal force, using coercion,
modernizing capabilities and winning competition. If the United States wants to restore and sustain
its existing military might, the need for a strategic change would be inevitable. The future of U.S
prosperity will be determined by the counter narrative to the reemergence of revisionist powers.
For the status-quo to alter, a defense strategy fighting the changing nature of war will further shape
the fate of the United States global military advantage and positioning in the international order.
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